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FACILITATING SUCCESSFUL FAILURES 
Michelle M. Harner*& Jamie Marincic Griffin† 
Abstract 
Approximately 80,000 businesses fail each year in the United States. 
This Article presents an original empirical study that surveys more than 
400 business restructuring professionals. The study focuses on a critical 
factor that arguably contributes to these failures—the conduct of boards 
of directors and management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
management of distressed companies often bury their heads in the sand 
until it is too late to remedy the companies’ problems, a phenomenon 
commonly called “ostrich syndrome.” The data confirm this behavior, 
shows a prevalent use of loss framing, and suggest trends consistent 
with prospect theory. This Article draws on both the data and behavioral 
economics to examine the genesis and contours of this problem. It then 
discusses potential changes to applicable law and introduces a new 
“meet and confer” process to encourage timely restructuring 
negotiations. The meet and confer process is designed to promote 
meaningful changes in management conduct and to facilitate more 
“successful failures.” Policymakers should adopt regulations that foster 
this mentality, rather than rewarding fear or ignorance in the face of 
failure. 
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Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again, 
this time more intelligently. 
-Henry Ford1 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost every company experiences financial distress at one point or 
another in its life cycle. Small businesses frequently incur significant 
losses for the first several years of operation, and many of those 
companies never realize a profit.2 Companies that do eventually realize 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Scott Allen, Henry Ford—Founder of Ford Motor Company and Assembly Line 
Innovator,ABOUT.COM: ENTREPRENEURS, http://entrepreneurs.about.com/od/famousentrepreneu 
rs/p/henryford.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: ADVOCACY: THE 
VOICE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN GOVERNMENT, available at 
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a profit often are, over time, unable to maintain those profits and 
growth.3 Even the most mature companies face financial challenges. 
Why then do some companies flourish despite (or perhaps because of) 
these challenges, while others collapse under the pressure? 
There likely is no single explanation, but one predominant factor is 
company management. Playing on the words of James Carville during 
the 1992 presidential race, “It’s the people, stupid.”4 The timing and 
substance of management’s decisions in the face of financial uncertainty 
are critical to the end result, regardless of what caused the distress in the 
first instance. Yet, those outside of that decision-making process often 
know relatively little about it, other than the loud criticism the public 
voices upon a company’s failure or the frequently empty praise it sings 
upon a company’s success. 
This Article presents an in-depth analysis of the role that 
management and boards of directors play in the resolution of 
companies’ financial distress. It uses the results of an original empirical 
survey of restructuring professionals along with behavioral economics 
to evaluate management decisions and the role of federal bankruptcy 
law in those decisions. Although every financial restructuring is unique 
in one or more respects, the data show common themes that underlie 
many cases and thus can guide policy reform in the insolvency context. 
No one likes to admit failure.5 This adage is true for most people, 
including boards of directors, chief executive officers, and other top 
executives in corporate America. Understanding this adage can facilitate 
an understanding of the choices management makes in the face of 
financial distress. Indeed, the adage underlies the “ostrich syndrome” 
that the corporate restructuring community frequently bemoans.6 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sbfaq.pdf (last updated Jan. 2011) (noting that while seven 
out of ten small businesses survive their first two years of operations, only five out of ten 
survive more than five years). 
 3. For a general description of business failures in the United States, see DUN & BRADSTREET, 
D&B U.S. BUSINESS TRENDS QUARTERLY REPORT (2011), available 
at http://www.dnb.com/content/dam/english/economic-and-industry-insight/us_business_trends_2011 
09.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (explaining the status of U.S. business failures currently estimated 
at approximately 80,000 per year in 2010 and 2011, and providing historical data reflecting similar 
levels of failure); DUN & BRADSTREET, D&B U.S. BUSINESS TRENDS 
REPORT (2011), available at http://www.dnb.com/content/dam/english/economic-and-industry-insight  
/us_business_trends_201101.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 4. See, e.g., Bill Schneider, Analysis: Could It Be ‘The Economy, Stupid’ Again?, CNN 
(Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/07/schneider.economy.poll/indexhtml. 
 5. See, e.g., Mark V. Pezzo & Stephanie P. Pezzo, Making Sense of Failure: A Motivated 
Model of Hindsight Bias, 25 SOC. COGNITION 147, 148 (2007) (explaining, among other things, 
two common responses to failure—“defensive processing” and “retroactive pessimism”—both 
of which deny accountability). 
 6. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Discussing the “B” Word with Corporate Boards, 
CREDIT SLIPS (June 17, 2010, 9:10 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/06/discussi
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Ostrich syndrome refers to management’s tendency to stick its 
collective head in the sand and ignore the warning signs of financial 
distress until it is too late to effectively resolve that distress. 
Admittedly, the timing to initiate effective restructuring negotiations 
is more art than science. It is a sensitive matter subject to many 
contingencies and factors, some of which are beyond management’s 
control. Nevertheless, a delay in restructuring discussions may place 
management in a weaker negotiating position with key creditor 
constituencies and allow short-term investors, whose interests may not 
necessarily align with others, to amass large holdings in the company’s 
capital structure. As a result, management may have fewer options once 
it finally starts restructuring discussions. 
Why is it difficult for individuals to admit either mistakes or failure, 
and what can or should the law do about it? The vast literature on 
behavioral economics offers some insight into the former,7 and the 
growing body of literature studying behavioral economics in corporate 
boardrooms has started to influence the latter.8 This Article further 
                                                                                                                     
ng-the-b-word-with-corporate-boards.html; John Tribe, Symptoms of Debtor Ostrich 
Syndrome?, BANKR., INSOLVENCY & CORP. RESCUE (Apr. 10, 2009, 8:02 AM), 
http://bankruptcyandinsolvency.blogspot.com/2009/04/symptoms-of-debtor-ostrich-syndrome 
-r3s.html (explaining “that those with financial problems do not think they ‘need’ debt advice, 
while those that do seek advice are not always going to the right places for it”). As an example, 
former CEO of Circuit City Alan L. Wurtzel said, in an interview after the company’s 
bankruptcy, that he wished the company had woken up sooner, but instead, “management 
ushered in the new century with largely the same strategy” the company had developed during 
1980, continuing to provide services customers no longer wanted. Rachel Feintzeig, Lessons 
from the Death of Circuit City, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:47 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/10/25/lessons-from-the-death-of-circuit-city. Wurtzel 
commented, “It wasn’t obvious in sales and earnings, but the rot had set in.” Id. 
 7. “Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that 
investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and 
complications.” Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Abstract, Behavioral Economics 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7948.pdf; see also Craig Lambert, The Marketplace of 
Perceptions, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 50, available at 
http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2006/03-pdfs/0306-50.pdf (explaining development of behavioral 
economics). But see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the 
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551–55 (1998) (criticizing behavioral economics). 
 8. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 
1807–10 (2001); Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 
510–14 (2008); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1985, at 83, 83–84, 99–108; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry 
into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: 
The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003) [hereinafter Dallas, 
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develops this literature with its focus on heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts 
to facilitate quick decisions) and cognitive bias in the distressed 
corporate boardroom. The representative heuristic, overconfidence and 
optimism biases, and framing effects can impede management’s 
decisions in distressed situations. Policymakers—as well as business 
executives and professionals—must consider these behavioral traits 
when they design and implement federal bankruptcy law.9 
For example, restructuring professionals and commentators often 
talk about filing for bankruptcy as a distressed company’s “option of 
last resort.” They typically use this expression to underscore the need 
for a distressed company to appreciate the significance of filing a 
Chapter 11 reorganization case. Such a filing has broad and potentially 
negative consequences and corporations should not undertake this 
process lightly.10 The Chapter 11 process does, however, offer a 
                                                                                                                     
Psychology of Enron’s Demise]; Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: 
Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 73–79 (1988) [hereinafter Dallas, 
Beyond Berle and Means]; Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power 
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–85 
(2002); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812–13 
(2001) [hereinafter Langevoort, Human Nature] (discussing the effect of personal relationships 
on information sharing between managers and boards); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized 
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and 
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997–1998) [hereinafter Langevoort, 
Organized Illusions] (discussing managers’ various constituencies, motivations to lie, and why 
regulations do not adequately deter misleading behavior); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the 
Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, 
Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) [hereinafter 
Langevoort, Corporate Thermostat]; Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate 
Governance, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 614, 619 (2005); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: 
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2003); Antony Page, Unconscious 
Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 286–89. See generally 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998) [hereinafter Langevoort, 
Literature Review] (discussing the increasing acceptance of “[b]ehavioral economics” in 
prominent economics and finance journals).  
 9. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 
2001, at 113, 113, 117–18 (providing examples of overconfidence leading to poor corporate 
decision-making); Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism 
Undermines Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 58 (examining cognitive 
biases applicable to business decisions). 
 10. Although potential operational disruptions and reputational harm can be mitigated 
with proper preparation, a company that files Chapter 11 may experience both. For example, the 
automatic stay of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code often halts payments to vendors and trade 
creditors (and sometimes even employees), and management must anticipate and address these 
types of issues in order to maintain products and services at pre-bankruptcy quality and quantity 
standards. Moreover, historically, bankruptcy suggested a lack of financial responsibility, and a 
stigma attached to individuals and companies that sought bankruptcy protection. Several 
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distressed company tools not otherwise available outside of bankruptcy, 
and the utility of those tools frequently turns on the timing of the 
bankruptcy filing.11 Accordingly, most restructuring professionals use 
the term “last resort” loosely, not necessarily to mean “use only if all 
else fails,” but to encourage careful deliberation of the matter.12 
But is that what a distressed company’s management hears? The 
term “last resort” typically means “you do it because you can find no 
other way of getting out of a difficult situation or of solving a 
problem.”13 Thus, the phrase “filing bankruptcy should be your option 
of last resort” may mean one thing to the restructuring professional and 
something completely different to a business executive not trained in 
bankruptcy parlance. It also might enable any heuristics and cognitive 
biases management harbors and confirm management’s entrenched 
views regarding any bankruptcy filing or the potential success of its 
existing business plan.14  
We conducted an extensive empirical survey of business 
restructuring professionals to test a basic hypothesis they developed 
through anecdotal evidence: Management of distressed companies often 
deny the extent of their companies’ distress and delay discussions of a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Over 400 restructuring professionals 
responded to the empirical survey (the Management Behavior Study). 
The survey data confirm the basic hypothesis and show some troubling 
trends. For example, the overwhelming majority of respondents use the 
phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” with distressed clients.15 Moreover, 
respondents who never used the phrase were significantly more likely to 
                                                                                                                     
commentators and anecdotal evidence suggest that this stigma no longer exists, but it also is a 
factor that companies must consider. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance 
and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 
729 & n.150 (2008). 
 11. Such tools include the debtor’s ability to decide unilaterally (for the most part) to 
assume or reject contracts and leases, to obtain financing that primes existing liens (thus 
providing a source of capital not available outside of bankruptcy), to sell some or all of its assets 
free and clear of all liens and claims, and to delay the payment of and restructure its prepetition 
obligations while continuing to operate the business. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 (the automatic 
stay), 363 (asset sales), 364 (financing), 365 (contracts and leases), 1129 (plan confirmation 
provisions) (2006).  
 12. See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
 13. COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH DICTIONARY FOR ADVANCED LEARNER’S ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2003). 
 14. For example, a framing bias may alter what management hears and in turn bolster any 
confirmation or overconfidence bias influencing management’s decisions. “[F]raming bias is the 
tendency to view a given problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which 
the problem is viewed.” Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in 
Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (describing the cognitive bias 
known as framing or anchoring).  
 15. See infra Subsection II.C.2. 
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have a client who initially refused, but ultimately did, file a bankruptcy 
case.16 That data may suggest those clients successfully restructure 
outside of the bankruptcy process or, more troubling, signal prospect 
theory at work: Professionals use a loss frame to discuss bankruptcy, 
and distressed clients pursue riskier out-of-court solutions that at best 
provide only short-term solutions. 
Better understanding management’s decisions in the face of a 
company’s distress can lead to better policies and outcomes. This 
Article makes original and meaningful contributions to this dialogue. 
Part I provides relevant background information about the restructuring 
alternatives for distressed companies as well as the heuristics and biases 
that potentially impact decision-making in this context. Part II then 
presents original empirical data and examines the data in light of the 
behavioral economics literature and prior studies. Part III uses these 
analyses to evaluate the existing restructuring landscape and suggests 
legislative reforms to mitigate the negative effects of heuristics in the 
distressed company context. These reforms include a revamp of the 
hybrid restructuring options for distressed companies that provides 
incentives and stronger legislative support for companies that begin 
restructuring discussions in a timely manner.17 This Article concludes 
by encouraging policymakers, professionals, and business executives to 
further consider how heuristics might impede successful reorganizations 
and to integrate countermeasures into both bankruptcy legislation and 
strategy discussions to foster more successful failures.  
I.  FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING 
Companies experience distress for a variety of reasons, both 
systemic and idiosyncratic.18 Systemic risk refers to factors that affect 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Subsection II.C.4; cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268–69 (1979) (discussing how 
individuals are more likely to take risks when they face two negative prospects). 
 17. See infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing the new concept of “meet and confer” 
process, or an MCP, that provides a more effective quasi-judicial option for distressed 
companies). 
 18. See, e.g., Dean Anderson & Elliot A. Fuhr, Diagnosing Distressed Companies: A 
Practical Example, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 1994, at 9, 9 tbl.1 (“Major Warning Signs of 
Financial Distress: Declining Net Income; Decreasing or Inadequate Margins; Creditors 
Unwilling to Advance Credit; Loss of a Major Supplier with Special Credit Terms; Reduction in 
Lines of Credit; Excessive Receivables over 90 Days; Default on Payment by a Major 
Customer; Excessive Payables Unpaid over 90 Days; Inability to Make Timely Deposits of 
Trust Funds such as Employee Withholding Taxes; Inability to Service Long-Term Debt 
Requirements; Excessive Re-negotiation of Broken Loan Covenants; Unusual or Extraordinary 
Litigation and Events Not Customarily Encountered in the Industry; Loss of Key Financial 
Officers or Key Personnel; Cash Management Becoming a Primary Activity at the Expense of 
Traditional Management Functions; New Long-Term Financing Proceeds Applied to Pay Off 
Debts Rather Than Acquisition of Assets; Poor Record Keeping or Inadequate Financial 
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entire industries or markets and are not unique to a particular 
company.19 The economic turmoil and resulting recession in 2008 
highlighted the global instability that systemic risk can trigger. 
Idiosyncratic risk refers to internal factors often specific to a particular 
company, such as its business lines, capital structure, or management 
activity or inactivity.20 Moreover, systemic risk can accelerate 
idiosyncratic risk and compound a company’s distress and restructuring 
efforts. 
Notably, when a company undertakes either an in- or out-of-court 
restructuring, management focuses on the systemic and external factors 
that cause the company’s distress. Press releases frequently tout a weak 
economy and softening customer demand as key drivers behind a 
company’s decision to file a Chapter 11 case.21 Management rarely 
identify idiosyncratic factors or risks that either their own decisions or 
their strategic objectives cause. 
Management’s reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for a 
company’s distress may be a natural human response, given individuals’ 
                                                                                                                     
Records; Lack of Basic Controls, such as Perpetual Inventory Record Keeping; Significant 
Discrepancies Between Actual and Projected Results over the Prior Three Years.”). The 
company Dun & Bradstreet uses several of these indicators to provide credit scores and supplier 
evaluation risk summaries for businesses. Instructional Guide, D&B, 
https://www.dnb.com/sassmo/help/InstructionalGuide.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 19.  One commentator notes: 
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger 
event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad 
economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect. These 
consequences could include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market 
failures. Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a chain of) 
significant losses to financial institutions or substantial financial-market price 
volatility. In either case, the consequences impact financial institutions, 
markets, or both.  
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO.  L.J. 193, 198 (2008). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and 
Transfer Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 671 (2002) (discussing one way idiosyncratic 
risk can work in practice by comparing inventory assets in the hands of a distributor as opposed 
to a local retailer); James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1187, 1189 n.2 (2007) (“‘Idiosyncratic,’ ‘unique,’ ‘firm-specific,’ or ‘diversifiable’ risk 
is risk that is particular to that specific firm.”).  
 21. Affidavit of Richard Golden in Support of First Day Motions and Applications at ¶ 15, 
In re UFood Restaurant Grp., No. 12-19702 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2012) (“[D]ue to 
economic downturn, the Debtors’ slow recovery there from, and certain other factors, certain of 
the company-owned UFood Outlets are struggling and are a drag on the Debtors’ businesses.”); 
Affidavit of Antoinette P. McCorvey at ¶ 10, In re Easte Kodak Company, No. 12-10202 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012) (“Since 2008, despite Kodak’s best efforts, restructuring costs 
and recessionary forces have continued to negatively impact the Company’s liquidity 
position . . . .”). 
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general reluctance to take ownership of their mistakes.22 Heuristics may 
reinforce this reaction. Several studies explore the impact on CEO and 
board decisions of confirmation and overconfidence biases.23 These 
potential management flaws can prove fatal to a distressed company. 
They may skew management’s perception of the company’s financial 
health and may delay necessary operational and restructuring activities. 
How a distressed company’s professionals frame and discuss with 
management the company’s restructuring alternatives may further 
enable these biases. 
This Part explains the basic legal and behavioral economics 
arguments pertinent to an analysis of management decision-making in 
the distressed company context. It first outlines the restructuring 
alternatives for a distressed company by summarizing the in- and out-
of-court options likely available to a distressed company. It then 
considers behavioral economics literature and its relevance to corporate 
boardrooms.  
A.  Restructuring Alternatives 
A troubled company may experience financial distress, economic 
distress, or both. Financial distress generally refers to the financial 
condition of the company, including its leverage, financial obligations 
to creditors, and ability to meet those obligations.24 Economic distress, 
on the other hand, refers to weaknesses in the company’s business 
model and operations.25 Although economic distress can lead to 
financial distress, the reverse progression can also occur, and cause the 
untimely demise of a profitable business model. In both cases, the 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Eugene Szwajkowski, Accounting for Organizational Misconduct, 11 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 401, 402 (1992) (describing the literature on the failure-to-take-responsibility 
phenomenon and noting how the discovery of organizational misconduct creates a predicament 
for a manager because the event may “cast[] undesired aspersions on the lineage, character, 
conduct, skills, or motives” of the manager, which may damage the individual’s social and 
professional standing).  
 23. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 8, at 531; Cunningham, supra note 8, at 350–51; Dallas, 
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 8, at 37; Dallas, Beyond Berle and Means, supra 
note 8, at 98–99; Greenfield, supra note 8, at 586; Langevoort, Human Nature, supra note 8, at 
812–13; Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 8, 139–142; Langevoort, Corporate 
Thermostat, supra note 8, at 299–302; Marnet, supra note 8, at 613–14; Page, supra note 8, at 
265–66. 
 24. Lemma W. Senbet & Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Financial Distress and 
Bankruptcy: A Survey, 5 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN FIN. 243 (2012) (manuscript at 7), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034646. 
 25. Id.; see also Michael L. Lemmon, Yung-Yu Ma & Elizabeth Tashjian, Restructuring 
and Post Emergence Performance of Bankrupt Firms: Evidence from the Post-1991 Period 10, 
12–13 (Apr. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Lower operating 
performance is associated with a greater degree of economic distress . . . .”). 
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substance and timing of management’s decisions are critical to the 
company’s ultimate success.26  
What constitutes success in the restructuring context is subject to 
debate. Some commentators focus on maximizing the business’s value 
while others emphasize rehabilitating the business and preserving jobs 
and economic development.27 An optimal restructuring strikes a balance 
between these competing goals and facilitates the reorganization of 
economically viable firms. Economic viability may result from 
deleveraging and, in some cases, revamping the business model.28 
Again, both outcomes largely depend on management’s restructuring 
path. 
Most commentators agree that management should pursue out-of-
court restructuring options before filing for bankruptcy.29 Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Lemma W. Senbet & James K. Seward, Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 921, 
951–53 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing how managerial ability and decision-making 
are important determinants of firm value both generally and when the firm is in distress). 
 27. See In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that 
value maximization should be the goal of Chapter 11); Hon. Leif M. Clark et al., What 
Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 
229–33 (1994) (discussing how a Chapter 11 case that provides workers with time to find new 
jobs is more successful than a Chapter 7 case with immediate job termination); James H.M. 
Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, but Better than the Alternatives, 14 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 6 art. 1 (2005) (noting two perspectives among Chapter 11 scholars, the 
“rehabilitationists” who view the rehabilitative aspects of Chapter 11 as valuable and those who 
think the current process is not useful).  
 28. See Lemmon, supra note 25, at 10, 12 (noting that firms classified as financially 
distressed are primarily distressed by high leverage but have “fundamentally sound business 
models”, whereas firms classified as economically distressed are characterized by “a business 
model with fundamental problems” and operating performance is the dominant source of 
distress); FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, BANKRUPTCY & RESTRUCTURING COMPENDIUM 2012, at 152 
(document on file with the Florida Law Review) (discussing large-scale bank deleveraging); id. 
at 60 (discussing business model changes in the airline industry).  
 29. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, First Report of the Select Advisory Committee on 
Business Reorganization, 57 BUS. LAW. 163, 179 (2001); Hon. Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-
Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 365 (1993) (noting that out-of-court 
workouts, when successful, are typically more beneficial to all parties than when a company 
utilizes the bankruptcy courts); Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt 
Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganizations of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 315, 319 (1990); see also Randolph J. Haines, Bankrupting the Opposition, 21 LITIG., 
Summer 1995, at 38, 40 (“Out-of-court workouts, even if they mean accepting pennies on the 
dollar, are usually quicker and cheaper than any bankruptcy, and therefore likely to return more 
to creditors. Moreover, the out-of-court workout probably stands a greater chance of permitting 
the debtor to remain in business, and thus be a valuable customer in the future.”); Bettina M. 
Whyte & Patricia D. Tilton, Turnarounds: Pursuing a Dual Path, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 
1995, at 28, 28 (“Generally speaking . . . an out-of-court workout is preferable to reorganizing 
under the Code due to the cost, image, drain or resources, impact on morale, etc. of a 
bankruptcy.”). 
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can be a lengthy and expensive process.30 Nevertheless, each option 
deserves independent consideration because each has particular 
advantages that depend on the company’s circumstances. To maximize 
the utility of any option, management must understand and remain open 
to all restructuring options. As described below, the prospects of a 
Chapter 11 case might encourage an out-of-court restructuring or 
streamline the bankruptcy process through a prepackaged bankruptcy 
case.31 
1.  Out-of-Court Restructurings 
An out-of-court restructuring typically involves a consensual 
agreement between the company and its major creditors to adjust the 
company’s capital structure. It also may accompany or facilitate an 
operational restructuring. The key attributes of most successful out-of-
court restructurings include a concentrated creditor group and a good 
working relationship between the company and its creditors, vendors, 
and suppliers. Although simple in concept, a private, consensual 
resolution can prove challenging to achieve because even one dissenting 
creditor can often derail the entire restructuring. 
The dissenting or “holdout” creditor’s power stems largely from 
provisions in both a company’s prepetition debt instruments and the 
Indenture Trust Act of 1939. For example, a credit facility or indenture 
might require a supermajority or unanimous voting threshold in order to 
waive certain defaults, request forbearance, or take other necessary 
actions to achieve the desired restructuring.32 Likewise, the Indenture 
Trust Act of 1939 provides that an indenture may not affect an 
individual bondholder’s right to receive the “payment of the principal of 
and interest . . . on or after the respective due dates . . . or to institute 
suit for the enforcement of any such payment” without the consent of 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 29, at 183–84 (noting that the many expenses 
associated with bankruptcy restructuring—filing fees, costs associated with compliance and 
reporting requirements, attorney’s fees, and costs associated with appearing in court—can be 
excessive); see also Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market 
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 299 (1989) (arguing that 
“the process of reorganization, especially if protracted, can destroy value”); Charles J. Tabb, 
The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 799–800 (1993) (discussing multiple studies 
regarding the large costs of Chapter 11).  
 31. See W. HOMER DRAKE JR. & CHRISTOPHER S. STRICKLAND, CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATIONS § 12:3 (2d ed. 2011) (providing a general overview of how prepackaged 
plans work generally); Gebbia-Pinetta, supra note 29, at 184 (“[B]oth the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission and the National Bankruptcy Conference have formally recommended that 
efforts be made to reduce unnecessary costs and delay in Chapter 11 restructurings by 
facilitating and expediting pre-packaged Chapter 11 reorganization cases.”).  
 32. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 250–51 
(1987) (discussing the legislative history of the Act and noting that both Congress and the SEC 
knew that this holdout problem could frustrate some out-of-court workouts). 
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the bondholder.33 Accordingly, an individual creditor may have 
significant influence over the extent and success of a company’s out-of-
court restructuring efforts. 
An out-of-court restructuring may take a variety of forms. A 
company may attempt to exchange its existing debt for either new notes 
with more favorable repayment terms or common stock in order to 
reduce the company’s overall leverage.34 It may engage in a program of 
asset disposal within the bounds of debt covenants. It may seek a 
strategic partner with some financing backing. It may also use a 
combination of these and other recapitalization options, which include 
the infusion of new capital or new investors into the capital structure.35 
Such restructurings are not, however, free from cost. The company 
likely must pay significant fees, and the restructuring may require 
concessions regarding operations and any future restructurings.  
Concessions in the face of an out-of-court restructuring may 
appropriately discipline management or, alternatively, unduly impede 
management’s ability to return a company to profitability. For example, 
management’s agreement to sell non-core assets or retain a Chief 
Restructuring Officer might help rightsize a business. The Chief 
Restructuring Officer may, however, have obligations to the creditors 
and encourage a company to forego projects that do not align with the 
creditors’ investment horizons or the interests of other constituents.36 
                                                                                                                     
 33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa, 77ppp(b) (2006); see also George W. Shuster, Jr., The Trust 
Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 436–37 
(2006) (discussing how 316(b) “provides contractually preemptive protection” “to one 
bondholder against other bondholders” “for payment of principal and interest when due”). 
 34. See, e.g., Saybrook Successfully Completes the Out-of Court Restructuring of Foster 
Wheeler, Ltd., BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 4, 2004, 6:05 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20041104005211/en/Saybrook-Successfully-Completes-Out-of-Court-Restructuring 
-Foster-Wheeler; Jennifer Weitzman, J. Crew Downgraded by Standard & Poor’s, WOMEN’S 
WEAR DAILY (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.wwd.com/fashion-news/fashion-features/j-crew-
downgraded-by-standard-poor-8217-s-734165 (subscription required); Continental Global 
Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/24008/000095015204005565/l08789ae8vk.txt; see also 
Gina Gutzeit & John Yozzo, Distressed Debt Exchanges: You Can Run, but You Can’t Hide, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2010, at 46, 46 (discussing how distressed debt exchanges, where a 
troubled borrower offers a creditor different securities in exchange for the debt claim, increased 
dramatically in 2009). See generally Edward I. Altman & Brenda Karlin, The Re-Emergence of 
Distressed Exchanges in Corporate Restructuring, 5 J. CREDIT RISK, Summer 2009, at 43, 
available at http://www.risk.net/digital_assets/4519/v5n2a3.pdf (discussing the re-emergence of 
distressed exchange as a restructuring mechanism). 
 35. See, e.g., Dan Trigoboff, XM Radio Gets $450M Infusion, BROADCASTING & CABLE 
(Dec. 29, 2002), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/145257-XM_Radio_Gets_ 450M
_Infusion.php.  
 36. See John Wm. Butler, Jr., Chris L. Dickerson & Stephen S. Neuman, Preserving State 
Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value Through Traditional Fiduciaries, 
18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 356 (2010) (noting that while some experts believe 
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Similarly, restrictive covenants and creditor veto rights in the 
restructuring documents may hinder future operations.37 For these 
reasons, management must tread carefully through the out-of-court 
restructuring negotiations. 
In this vein, management’s openness to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process might hold value in restructuring discussions. Management’s 
ability to explain creditors’ rights in, and the landscape of, any Chapter 
11 case for the company allows all parties to appreciate the choices at 
hand and may provide management with leverage in negotiations.38 
Nevertheless, this approach also requires management to confront both 
its own failings and the possibility that management might have to air 
those failings in a very public forum—a thought often repugnant to 
management. Consequently, the Chapter 11 option often enters the 
discussion, if at all, too late in the process. 
2.  Bankruptcy Restructurings 
A distressed company may file a Chapter 7 liquidation case or a 
Chapter 11 reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Code. In a 
Chapter 7 case, a bankruptcy trustee replaces the company’s 
management and works to sell the company’s assets to repay its 
creditors.39 In a Chapter 11 case, the company’s management generally 
stays in control of the company and its reorganization efforts;40 the 
company operates as a “debtor-in-possession” with essentially the same 
                                                                                                                     
independent, third-party chief restructuring officers can prove beneficial, the use of CROs raises 
serious conflict of interest issues because CROs can be “predisposed to favor only one entity 
involved in the debtor’s chapter 11 reorganization: the creditor who was responsible for getting 
them hired”). 
 37. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 153, 198 (2004) (discussing the expanding power of secured creditors in the 
Chapter 11 process, which is due in part to credit facillities’ use of restrictive covenants and 
rights of control provisions); Martin J. Whitman, Stanley J. Garstka & Myron M. Sheinfeld, A 
Rejoinder to “The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,” 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 839, 856–57 (1993) 
(discussing restrictive covenants such as cash sweeps and prohibitions on future borrowing that 
can impair the reorganization process). 
 38. See, e.g., John C. DiDonato & Daniel P. Wikel, Managing Traditional Chapter 11 
Reorganizations: A Primer for Directors and Officers on Bankruptcy Fundamentals, in 
NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ GUIDE TO 
RESTRUCTURING 214, 214 (John Wm. Butler, Jr. ed., 2010) (“Sometimes the best weapon, and 
strongest negotiation tactic with creditor constituents, is to play the ‘bankruptcy card’. Most 
parties are aware that filing for protection affords companies ‘time out’ from their creditors and 
the precious time to regroup.”). 
 39. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–727 (2006) (showing general Chapter 7 provisions of 
Bankruptcy Code); id. §§ 701–704 (discussing the selection of a trustee and duties of a trustee). 
 40. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1146 (2006) (showing general Chapter 11 
provisions of Bankruptcy Code). 
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rights, duties, and powers as a bankruptcy trustee.41 A company can sell 
some or all of its assets in a Chapter 11 case,42 and creditors can request 
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or examiner.43 Notably, the 
actual appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is the exception rather than 
the rule.44 
Not surprisingly, when bankruptcy is necessary, most companies 
prefer to file Chapter 11 cases. As noted above, in Chapter 11 cases the 
company—through its management—stays in control of the process and 
continues to operate its business. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code 
offers management a number of useful restructuring tools. For example, 
the bankruptcy filing triggers an automatic stay, which prevents parties 
from prepetition actions and the collection of prepetition debts against 
the company. The debtor retains the unilateral ability to decide whether 
to keep or reject most types of contracts and leases, and has a significant 
period of time to make this decision. The debtor may sell some or all of 
its assets free and clear of most claims, liens, and encumbrances. It also 
has an initial exclusive period to file a proposed plan of reorganization. 
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor assistance in the 
negotiation and structure of post-petition financing. 
Nevertheless, management of a distressed company may have 
operational and reputational concerns that relate to a Chapter 11 filing. 
Although some originally characterized the amendments as creating a 
pro-debtor forum,45 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code reallocate 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id. § 1107 (discussing the rights, powers, and duties of a company as a debtor-in-
possession). 
 42. Id. § 363 (permitting sales of a debtor’s assets in the ordinary course of business or, 
with prior notice and approval, outside of the ordinary course of business); see  also Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 673–74 (2003) 
(discussing how the asset sales in Chapter 11 today are inconsistent with past conceptions of 
bankruptcy reorganization); Ali M.M. Mojdehi & Janet Dean Gertz, The Implicit “Good Faith” 
Requirement in Chapter 11 Liquidations: A Rule in Search of a Rationale?, 14 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 143, 152–53 (2006) (discussing history, scholarship, and case law in regard to 
companies using Chapter 11 to liquidate and sell assets rather than to reorganize and re-emerge). 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (discussing appointment of a trustee or examiner); see also Kelli A. 
Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 83 (2007) 
(commenting that the “conventional wisdom . . . that Chapter 11 trustees should almost never be 
appointed . . . is wrong”); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in 
Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1012 (1994) 
(discussing creditors threatening to petition the court to appoint a trustee if managers do not 
resign); Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (defining the role 
of examiners and Congress’s reasoning for creating them). 
 44. See Alces, supra note 43, at 84 (noting that companies rarely pursue the appointment 
of a trustee in bankruptcy); Lipson, supra note 43, at 50 (noting that while examiners are more 
likely to appear in larger cases, they are still rare—even among larger cases).  
 45. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 101 (1983) (noting that 
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power in many Chapter 11 cases to allow prepetition lenders, landlords, 
counterparties, and other constituencies to significantly influence the 
process.46 For example, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) shortened a debtor’s exclusive period 
to file a reorganization plan and limited the types of retention and 
severance benefits available to a debtor’s top management.47 BAPCPA 
also truncated the debtor’s time to assume or reject commercial real estate 
leases and elevated the priority of a vendor’s reclamation claims against 
the debtor.48 In addition, various amendments broaden the protections 
afforded counterparties under certain types of derivatives and financial 
contracts with a debtor, all of which potentially cause a debtor to lose 
significant value on the first day of a bankruptcy case.49 
The constant power struggle with Chapter 11—played out in 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and in bankruptcy courts 
throughout the United States—is counterproductive to the common 
goals of the debtor and all of its constituencies, i.e., maximization of 
value and rehabilitation of viable businesses. Neither a pro-debtor nor a 
pro-creditor system achieves an optimal result.50 As such, the current 
                                                                                                                     
debtor companies were generally “successful in dictating the terms of reorganization to their 
creditors”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 247–48 (1983) (noting that creditors 
historically took little interest in bankruptcy proceedings because the bankruptcy legislation did 
not “provide the means for them to exercise meaningful control or to make their participation 
profitable”). See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW IN AMERICA 212–32 (2001) (explaining historical aspects of the perception that bankruptcy 
laws favored debtors). 
 46. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 42, at 675 (describing creditor control as the 
dominant theme in modern Chapter 11 cases). 
 47. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); see 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 503(c), 1121(d) (2006).  
 48. See Robert N.H. Christmas, Designation Rights—A New, Post-BAPCPA World, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006, at 10, 10 (noting the new timing limitation will dramatically affect 
debtors); David L. Woods, Reclamation Under BAPCPA: Model for Uniformity?, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., July/Aug. 2007, at 40, 40 (discussing how the BAPCPA provisions expanded the ability 
of a seller to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer). 
 49. Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
697, 712 (2005) (describing how Congress concluded “that expanded [protections for 
counterparties, etc] will promote the stability of worldwide capital markets and that this public 
good (reducing systemic risk) justifies preserving less value for creditors in a single bankruptcy 
proceeding”); Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New 
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 641 (2005) (discussing amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which 
“now protect[] any counterparty to any derivatives contract”); Michael H. Weiss, Using 
Derivatives to Create Bankruptcy Proof Loans, 30 CAL. BANKR. J. 207, 268 (2010) (describing 
how BAPCPA effectively removes large numbers of transactions from the bankruptcy process, 
which is historically designed to treat creditors in an orderly and fair manner). 
 50. See, e.g., 1 BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW 
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power balance that arguably favors various creditor constituencies often 
causes distressed companies to either forego Chapter 11 or delay any 
Chapter 11 filing to their detriment. Anecdotal and empirical data 
suggest that management fears loss of control and loss of valuable 
contract rights.51 
A distressed company’s management also may fear losing face. 
Once a company files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it basically operates 
inside a public fishbowl.52 The company must disclose extensive 
information that concerns its prepetition and current operations and 
obligations. Various parties, which include a statutory committee of 
unsecured creditors, have rights to review and investigate management 
activities.53 Empirical studies also document a high turnover in top 
management of bankrupt companies, which may cause some managers 
to worry about job security if they discuss bankruptcy options.54 
Moreover, bankruptcy often carries the stigma of failure and is a very 
public recognition of a management’s deficiencies.55  
On balance, in the current legislative environment, management of a 
distressed company may be reluctant to consider bankruptcy as a viable 
restructuring option. If management ignores this option, however, out-
                                                                                                                     
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, at i (1997) (“A bankruptcy system that does not balance the 
interests of creditors and the interests of debtors will have neither their confidence nor, of even 
greater importance, the confidence of the American people.”). 
 51. See infra Part II; see also A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A 
Reply to Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 109, 133–34 (2004) (discussing how 
managers of insolvent or nearly insolvent firms make biased decisions and also experience fear 
that they are about to lose their job). 
 52. Brad B. Erens & Kelly M. Neff, Confidentiality in Chapter 11, 22 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 47, 48 (2005) (describing how bankruptcy court filings are publicly available and how 
displaying proceedings in a public forum often is not in the best interest of the company or its 
creditors).  
 53. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(a)(1)–(5) (providing that the debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) or trustee must: file and transmit a report containing a complete inventory of the property 
of the debtor; “keep a record of receipts and the disposition of money and property received”; 
file reports and summaries statutorily required, which must include additional information if 
payments are made to employees; and provide quarterly reports that regard any disbursements 
and any fees payable for that quarter); id. 2015.3(a) (providing that the DIP or trustee must “file 
periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a 
publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a 
substantial or controlling interest”); 11 U.S.C. § 308 (2006) (discussing the reporting 
requirements applicable to small business cases).  
 54. See Dickerson, supra note 51, at 132 n.110, 134; see also Ramesh K.S. Rao, David 
Simon Sokolow & Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on 
Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 67 (1996) (citing to 
empirical studies by Stuart Gilson, Lynn LoPucki, and their colleagues, regarding high turnover 
amongst management and directors prior to and during bankruptcy). 
 55. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 51, at 134 (noting that directors of insolvent firms 
take into account the anticipated reputational harm and public scrutiny they may face if or when 
the company files for bankruptcy).  
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of-court restructurings may weaken management’s position and inhibit 
hybrid restructuring efforts, such as a prepackaged plan of 
reorganization.56 A company must be willing to consider bankruptcy, 
however, in order to assess the utility of any hybrid restructuring plan. 
3.  Prepackaged Restructurings 
A prepackaged plan of reorganization, which is similar to most 
hybrid restructuring tools, typically involves a private restructuring 
arrangement the company implements through a judicial process.57 It 
has the potential to mitigate some of the concerns critics frequently 
voice about a full-blown Chapter 11 case.58 It is not a restructuring 
option, however, for every distressed company, and its current structure 
confines the types of distress the process successfully resolves. 
For the most part, non-bankruptcy law governs prepackaged plans 
that represent a privately negotiated contract solution to a company’s 
distress.59 This aspect of the process subjects it to several of the 
limitations discussed above in the context of pure out-of-court 
workouts. For example, the company does not receive the benefit of an 
automatic stay, and it may find it difficult to identify and bring to the 
negotiating table the necessary parties.60 Prepackaged plans also usually 
apply only to the resolution of bank and funded debt claims because of 
both collective action problems and challenges from representing 
unsecured creditors, vendors, employees, and shareholders at the 
negotiating table.61 This may expose the company to ongoing 
vulnerability, either because of the company’s failure to truly 
deleverage the balance sheet or because of the new burdens the only 
constituencies at the table—typically banks and bondholders—
impose.62 
                                                                                                                     
 56. JOSE M. GARRIDO, A WORLD BANK STUDY: OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING 48–
49 (2012). 
 57. Id. at 49. 
 58. See Duberstein, supra note 29, at 365 (1993) (“Since the prepackaged plan is 
negotiated before the [C]hapter 11 case starts, it can take advantage of all the benefits available 
under the Code without the detriments of a prolonged and expensive proceeding . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Marc S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The 
Deleveraging Tool of the ’90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 
643, 663 (1991))). 
 59. Harner, supra note 10, at 739. 
 60. See id. at 737–39 (“The consensual nature of an out-of-court restructuring limits its 
usefulness.”). 
 61. Id. at 739. 
 62. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company 
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 
VAND. L. REV. 231, 252 (2001) (“[C]ompanies emerging from prepackaged bankruptcies after 
1990 were more likely to refile than were companies emerging from non-prepackaged cases 
during the same period.”). 
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In a pure prepackaged plan scenario, the company solicits 
acceptances of the proposed plan from the debtholders whose claims the 
plan modifies. This solicitation must comply with applicable non-
bankruptcy law, which includes federal securities law, for any public 
securities the plan involves.63 If the debtholder’s acceptance of the plan 
comports with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, the company 
then commences a Chapter 11 case to confirm and implement the 
prepackaged plan.64 This can be a relatively quick process.65 If the 
company does not receive acceptable support for the plan, it can start 
the process over or commence its Chapter 11 case as a prearranged plan 
case. In the prearranged plan scenario, the company may refine the 
prepetition plan and solicit acceptances of the plan again through the 
formal solicitation and confirmation procedures under the Bankruptcy 
Code.66 
Both prepackaged and prearranged plans are alternatives to a long, 
contentious bankruptcy case, but they are only two of a distressed 
company’s options and, as currently structured, provide only limited 
relief. Moreover, if a company is unwilling to discuss bankruptcy-
related tools, it may discount or ignore any hybrid restructuring options. 
The challenge, then, is to foster with management a meaningful 
dialogue that concerns the company’s distress and that accounts for all 
of its restructuring options at a time that still permits full exploitation of 
those options. The next section of this Article discusses the heuristics 
and cognitive biases that can potentially confound this discussion.   
B.  Heuristics and Bias in Decision-Making 
Business decisions are complex, time-sensitive, and, in the distressed 
context, almost always subject to controversy.67 Even the most skilled 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Harner, supra note 10, at 739. 
 64. Id. at 739–40.  
 65. According to BankruptcyData.com, one of the quickest prenegotiated or prepackaged 
bankruptcies since 2009 was for Baseline Oil & Gas Corp, which was filed August 28, 2009 and 
was confirmed twenty-eight days later. Douglas M. Foley & James E. Van Horn, Prepacks on 
the Rise in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Prenegotiated Plans Can Accelerate Reorganization, 
TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.
aspx?objectID=9655; see also In re Baseline Oil & Gas Corp., No. 09-36291, 2009 Bankr. 
LEXIS 5453, at *1–2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 66. Harner, supra note 10, at 740–41.  
 67. See GPC XLI, L.L.C. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS, 
2008 WL 4293781, at *1–2, *4, *12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (involving a group of minority 
shareholders who, after the company emerged from Chapter 11, brought a derivative action on 
behalf of the corporation against the dominant shareholder (a company “whose business model 
involved taking control of distressed companies and positioning itself to reap the benefits of 
control for itself and its investors”) and its directors and alleged unfairness in connection with a 
complex post-bankruptcy financing transaction); see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
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executives need input and support to make these decisions. Many 
executives find this support in their colleagues and professional 
advisers.68 The value of that support to the company, however, may turn 
on the decision maker’s own heuristics and cognitive biases.69 
1.  Examples of Heuristics and Biases 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts individuals use to facilitate quick and 
decisive action, often at the expense of ignoring relevant information.70 
These shortcuts—also referred to as “decision-making strategies”—rely 
on factors easily accessible by the decision-maker, such as prior 
experiences (e.g., representative heuristics) and emotions (e.g., 
confirmation, overconfidence, and loss-aversion biases).71 Corporate 
managers may invoke any number of these mental strategies to respond 
with the speed and efficacy that stakeholders and markets demand.72 A 
                                                                                                                     
1209, 1236–37 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003). See generally Loral 
Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Loral Space & Commc’ns, Ltd., 342 B.R. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). When a company experiences financial distress, a number of different constituencies, 
which include lenders, may place pressure on management. Moreover, at least one commentator 
suggests that this pressure and influence exists even outside of the distressed context. See 
Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in 
Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 120 (2009) (“Lender influence is pervasive. 
Empirical research documents the regularity with which banks constrain fundamental 
managerial decisions even in the ordinary course of business.”). 
 68. See, e.g., CORP. LAWS COMM., ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook—Sixth Edition, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 989 (2011) (discussing the board’s options for 
staying informed and finding support). 
 69. For a general discussion of heuristics and biases, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 59–208 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Inga Chira, Michael Adams & Barry 
Thornton, Behavioral Bias Within the Decision Making Process, 6 J. BUS. & ECON. RES., Aug. 
2008, at 11, 11 (“[Behavioral finance] draws on the psychology and cognitive science literatures 
to examine why individual decision-making often deviates from rational choices in systematic 
ways.”); Langevoort, Literature Review, supra note 8, at 1501–02. See generally Roger G. Noll 
& James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 747 (1990) (discussing the implications of cognitive psychology in high-risk decision-
making). 
 70. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 454 (2011) (“A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, 
with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex 
methods.”). 
 71. See Eyal Ert & Ido Erev, The Rejection of Attractive Gambles, Loss Aversion, and the 
Lemon Avoidance Heuristic, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 715, 721 (2008) (discussing loss aversion 
bias in heuristic decision-making); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
751, 766 (2003) (discussing the use of prior experience in heuristic decision-making); Larissa Z. 
Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of 
Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 973 
(2001) (discussing emotions and moods in heuristic decision-making). 
 72. Jaana Woiceshyn, Lessons from “Good Minds”: How CEOs Use Intuition, Analysis 
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few strategies are particularly relevant in the context of distressed 
companies. 
The representative heuristic refers to individuals who draw upon past 
experiences and “perceived similarity to a particular known group or 
event” when they make decisions in the face of uncertainty.73 This 
heuristic can prove useful and can help managers avoid paralysis in 
difficult decisions. It also, however, can create false assumptions that 
cause errors in judgment.74 For example, a CEO or director who knows 
of colleagues who have lost their jobs or suffered reputational damage 
when their companies filed for bankruptcy might factor that into her 
decision. Likewise, she might reference the frequently negative media 
coverage of companies that file Chapter 11 cases, such as headlines 
reading, With A123’s Bankruptcy, America’s Battery Biz Goes Dead, 
and Ding Dong, Are Twinkies Dead?75 These representations likely will 
taint her assessment and conclusions regarding the appropriate path for 
her distressed company. 
Not only might a manager discount a bankruptcy or restructuring 
alternative based on a representative heuristic, but a manager also might 
honestly believe that she is exceptionally skilled and can turn around her 
                                                                                                                     
and Guiding Principles to Make Strategic Decisions, 42 LONG RANGE PLANNING 298, 299 
(2009) (“Studies have found systematic, rational analysis insufficient to deal effectively with 
complexity. The overall conclusion of the research so far is that experienced decision 
makers . . . rely on intuition to supplement, or at times even to substitute for, rational 
analysis. . . . Studies suggest that many corporate executives use more intuition than formal 
analysis in making decisions.”); T.K. Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, Cognitive Biases and Strategic 
Decision Processes: An Integrative Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 757, 773 (1999) (noting that 
“[h]euristics and biases are often valuable and indispensable for effective decision making. This 
may be particularly relevant for strategic decisions”). But see id. at 760 (describing potential 
negative consequences of heuristics on strategic decision-making). 
 73. Mark R. Kebbell, Damon A. Muller & Kirsty Martin, Understanding and Managing 
Bias, in DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTIES IN POLICING SERIOUS CRIME 87, 89 (Gabriele Bammer 
ed., 2010). See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (discussing generally cognitive biases in decision-
making). 
 74. See Das & Teng, supra note 72, at 760 (“Although these ‘rules of thumb’ are often 
necessary and useful, they also introduce cognitive biases that can lead to severe and systematic 
errors in decision making.” (citation omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 71, at 766–67, 775 (noting 
how emotions and overconfidence can negatively interfere with decision-making); Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 73, at 1124 (“In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes 
they lead to severe and systematic errors.”). 
 75. Michael V. Copeland, With A123’s Bankruptcy, America’s Battery Biz Goes Dead, 
WIRED.COM (Oct. 16, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/10/a123-
bankruptcy; Ding Dong, Are Twinkies Dead?, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://wvgazette.com/News/Business/201211160143; see also Tiffany Kary & Linda Sandler, 
Borders Files Bankruptcy, Is Closing Up to 275 Stores, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:12 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-16/borders-book-chain-files-for-bankruptcy-
protection-with-1-29-billion-debt.html. 
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company where others could not. Such an overconfidence bias distorts a 
decision maker’s assessment of her ability to achieve the desired goal. 
Those affected by an overconfidence bias “overestimate their abilities, 
believe that they know more than they in fact do, and suffer from an 
‘illusion of control,’ believing that they exert more control over results 
than they actually do.”76 Commentators consider potential issues with 
CEO overconfidence in the context of mergers and acquisitions, 
investment decisions, risk assessment, and corporate governance 
generally.77 These issues, which include overestimation of the value of 
projects and the likelihood of positive outcomes, apply in the context of 
distressed companies as well. Indeed, a distressed company may 
experience more significant negative consequences because of the CEO’s 
unfounded belief that the distress is temporary or that she can help the 
company overcome the downturn.78 
In theory, other managers and directors should serve as a check to 
counter any representative heuristic or overconfidence bias that impairs 
a CEO or manager’s decision-making. In practice, however, an 
optimism bias may limit the effectiveness of this check. Individuals who 
work with the decision-maker may fear that if they dissent to a proposed 
course of action they will appear either as disloyal or as an outlier. As 
Professors Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman explain: 
Organizations also actively discourage pessimism, which is 
often interpreted as disloyalty. The bearers of bad news 
tend to become pariahs, shunned and ignored by other 
employees. When pessimistic opinions are suppressed, 
while optimistic ones are rewarded, an organization’s 
ability to think critically is undermined. The optimistic 
biases of individual employees become mutually 
reinforcing, and unrealistic views of the future are validated 
by the group.79 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA.  ST. U. L. REV. 673, 689 (2005). 
 77. See id. (arguing that corporations should adjust corporate governance to manage CEO 
overconfidence); see also Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 597, 624–25 (1989) (discussing optimism and overpayment in corporate takeovers); Ulrike 
Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s 
Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (studying confidence in CEOs for M&A transactions 
and financial investment decisions); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate 
Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197, 200 (1986) (discussing overconfidence,or “hubris,” in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions).  
 78. See infra Subsection II.C.4; see also Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk 
Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1354 (2010) (discussing how CEOs and executives 
“overestimate their own abilities” and “believe that they are the exception to the rule”).  
 79. Lovallo & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 60–61. 
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Accordingly, management may talk each other into a frenzy of 
agreement on an ill-fated course of action. Moreover, management may 
draw on the support of colleagues and the negative perception of 
bankruptcy to confirm the substance of their decision and thereby 
introduce a confirmation bias into the equation.80 
A fellow manager or director is not the only individual who can 
enable or validate a decision maker’s errors in judgment. Professionals 
(lawyers, financial advisers, and accountants) who advise corporate 
management also can play such a role in a variety of ways. For 
example, an adviser may provide information that suggests certain 
advantages to the decision maker’s proposed action. Even if the adviser 
also explains the disadvantages, the decision-maker likely will latch on 
to the positive aspects to confirm her belief. Advisers may soften their 
advice to please the client and contribute to an optimism bias. Advisers, 
by their words, tone, and phrasing, also may frame issues in a manner 
that affects a client’s decision-making process.81  
2.  The Framing Bias and Restructurings 
Studies show that the way a person frames or communicates an issue 
affects how others perceive the problem.82 The following data from the 
                                                                                                                     
 80. In addition, a related bias—commitment bias—may prevent management from 
changing their decision even after the error in judgment is recognized. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS 
& LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND 
COMMITMENT 15 (1977).  
 81. See Katherina Glac, Understanding Socially Responsible Investing: The Effect of 
Decision Frames and Trade-Off Options, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 41, 43–44 (2008) (describing the 
operation of framing bias in a clear and relatively detailed manner); Richard W. Painter, 
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 
404 (2004) (discussing framing bias in the corporate context); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, 
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 122–23 (1996) (explaining 
framing bias generally); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The 
Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 784 (1997) (explaining framing bias in 
investment decisions); X.T. Wang, Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 145, 146 (1996) (discussing framing 
bias generally). 
 82. See Weinstein, supra note 14, at 797 (2003); see also William A. Boettcher III, 
Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk 
Behavior, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 331, 349 (2004) (discussing a study of how framing affects 
public opinion on U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises); Michael J. Hiscox, Through 
a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue 
Framing, 60 INT’L ORG. 755, 777–78 (2006) (reporting findings from a study aimed at 
measuring the impact of issue framing on individuals’ attitudes in regard to international trade). 
See generally Theresa M. Marteau, Framing of Information: Its Influence Upon Decisions of 
Doctors and Patients, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 89 (1989) (discussing a study of doctor and 
patient decision-making for certain medical treatments and how the presentation of options and 
probabilities influences those decisions). 
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work of Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman illustrate a 
framing bias: 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the 
outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs 
are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved 
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability 
that no people will be saved 
In this version of the problem, a substantial majority of 
respondents favor Program A, indicating risk aversion. 
Other respondents, selected at random, receive a question 
in which the same cover story is followed by a different 
description of the options: 
If Program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die 
If Program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability 
that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 
people will die 
A substantial majority of respondents now favor Program 
B’, the risk-seeking option.83 
Many commentators suggest that phrasing issues in terms of certain 
losses (a loss frame) produces risk-seeking conduct.84 This effect—
which prospect theory also explains—“argues that the value of gains 
and losses are experienced differently; for example, people are more 
likely to take risks in the domain of losses because of diminishing 
sensitivity to large losses, producing a convex portion of the value 
function.”85 At least one study suggests that an individual’s desire to 
avoid sure losses and seek more risks when presented with a loss frame 
intensifies if that individual is also in a high-power position.86 That 
study theorizes a link between the optimism bias, often present in 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1458 (2003) (quoting Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981)). 
 84. See Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 119. See generally Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, 
Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003) (agreeing with the general 
hypothesis regarding framing and presenting an overview of much of the legal literature on the 
subject). 
 85. Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinksy, Power, Optimism, and Risk-Taking, 36 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 511, 520 (2006). 
 86. Id. at 521. 
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individuals who hold positions of power, and framing effects—i.e., 
powerful individuals take more risks when they face certain loss 
because they believe that they will beat the odds.87 
This effect has direct and significant application to management of 
distressed companies. A CEO who perceives bankruptcy as failure will 
likely take more risks to avoid that result and will likely believe she will 
succeed in her efforts. Likewise, the CEO who receives professional 
advice that “bankruptcy should be considered only if all other options 
fail” or that “bankruptcy is a last resort” likely will behave in a similar 
manner. Accordingly, management of distressed companies may forego 
or delay viable restructuring options that relate to bankruptcy in the 
hope that they will hit the proverbial home run. 
The potential ramifications of heuristics and biases on decision-
making in the distressed company context raise several important 
questions: Do CEOs and management really hold such negative views 
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and, if so, do professional advisers reinforce 
these views? Do those views affect management’s decisions for 
distressed companies? Does the conversation that surrounds distress and 
restructuring need to change? 
We conducted the Management Behavior Study to explore these and 
related questions. The next Part describes the study and suggests a need 
for further research and reevaluation of how management and 
professionals think about and discuss restructuring alternatives. 
II.  ASSESSING MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING IN DISTRESS: THE 
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR STUDY 
We probably did take longer (to file for Chapter 11) 
than we should have because you never want to have that 
feeling of failure and you always want to fight it out.88 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that business executives hold a negative 
perception of Chapter 11 bankruptcy and delay consideration of 
restructuring as an option, often at the expense of the company and its 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. (“This suggests that activating high-power drove individuals to be more risk-
taking, but that activating low-power did not lead individuals to be more risk averse.”); see also 
Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 
53 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 646 (1987) (discussing the theory of motivated inference 
and presenting four studies suggesting that people “generate theories that view their own 
attributes as more predictive of desirable outcomes and are reluctant to believe in theories that 
imply that their own attributes might be related to undesirable events”). 
 88. Chelsea Emery, CEOs Wait Too Long Before Filing Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 
2009, 4:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/02/us-bankruptcy-psychology-
idUSTRE5310AY20090402 (quoting Joseph Vicens, chief operating officer of 
1800mattress.com).  
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stakeholders.89 Moreover, business bankruptcy commonly is described as 
“an option of last resort” in the commentary and professional advisory 
materials on the subject.90 Yet no studies thoroughly analyze in any 
meaningful detail these factors or their impact on corporate value or 
successful restructurings.91 The Management Behavior Study fills that 
void. 
As this Article more fully describes below, the Management 
Behavior Study offers valuable insight on key components of 
management’s decision-making process in the distressed context. The 
data include responses from over 400 restructuring professionals and 
uncover interesting trends in client advising and decision-making. 
Overall, the data suggest a need for policymakers, business executives, 
and professionals to reevaluate the dialogue and incentive structure that 
surrounds Chapter 11 business cases. 
A.  Methodology 
The Management Behavior Study targeted individuals frequently 
involved in business restructurings and Chapter 11 cases—specifically, 
professionals such as lawyers and financial advisers who work in this 
realm.92 The primary goal of the study was to collect information from 
professionals regarding their experiences with and observations about 
client advising and management behavior in the distressed company 
context. We designed the study to test the following hypothesis: 
Management of distressed companies often deny the extent of their 
companies’ distress and delay discussions of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filing.  
We used a database of professionals, which the American Bankruptcy 
Institute maintains, to structure the sample population.93 The database 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum 
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1397 (2000) (“[M]anagers will 
seek to preserve their control of the firm despite the costs to investors, even if they only are able 
to delay their own day of reckoning by a few months.”). 
 90. See DiDonato & Wikel, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing the tendency of directors to 
“exhaust ‘out of court’ restructuring options such as asset or business sales, amending their 
credit facilities and seeking replacement or bridging capital to improve the company’s liquidity 
position and ‘weather the storm’”); Ian Mount, Adviser to Businesses Laments Changes to 
Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at B9 (stating that Chapter 11 is “an absolute last 
resort”). 
 91. For a thoughtful survey of empirical literature concerned with Chapter 11 
bankruptcies, see generally Senbet & Wang, supra note 24, at 27–47. 
 92. The survey specifically asked respondents to identify their typical role in restructuring 
matters. See infra Section II.C. We did not exclude individuals based on the identity of their 
typical clients. Rather, we sought to capture both the company and stakeholder perspectives on 
the process because they recognized that professionals who primarily represented stakeholders 
might have a limited or different perspective on certain questions. 
 93. The American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) “is the largest multi-disciplinary, non-
230 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
contained 2,296 individuals. We reviewed the database and identified a 
sample frame of 2,181 individuals.94 We then drew a random sample of 
1,200 individuals. After we identified ineligible respondents, we invited 
1,160 individuals to participate.95 The data collection schedule included 
an initial email request (sent September 24, 2012), two reminder email 
requests (sent October 1 and October 22, 2012), one reminder letter 
(mailed October 12, 2012), and one clarification email (sent October 22, 
2012). We received 453 responses to the study for a valid response rate of 
39.1%.96  
B.  Study Design 
We designed a survey tool to facilitate the Management Behavior 
Study. The survey included twenty questions carefully crafted to elicit 
non-privileged information concerning professionals’ experiences with 
management of distressed companies.97 The majority of the questions 
used objective choices, with the opportunity for respondents to explain 
certain responses in a narrative format. The survey was web based and 
included programmed skip patterns to minimize respondent error. 
The core questions in the survey focused on the concept of 
bankruptcy as “an option of last resort” and management’s reaction to 
that concept and their companies’ distress generally. The survey also 
asked for information about the timing of bankruptcy filings and the key 
drivers behind that decision. In addition, it collected information on 
respondents’ respective industries and extent of experience in 
restructuring matters. A copy of the survey is annexed at Appendix A. 
                                                                                                                     
partisan organization dedicated to research and education on matters related to insolvency.” 
About ABI, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section
=About_ABI (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). The ABI is not a sponsor of this study. The ABI’s only 
involvement with this study was to provide us with a copy of the database. Professor Harner has, 
however, previously received grant funding from the ABI and is the Reporter for the ABI 
Commission Studying the Reform of Chapter 11.  
 94. One-hundred-and-fifteen individuals in the database previously opted out of 
communications with SurveyMonkey, the software the authors used to administer the online 
survey.  
 95. In their review of the database, we determined that certain individuals were ineligible 
for the study either because of their profession (e.g., they were no longer in private practice or 
had no recent or relevant private practice experience), potential conflicts, or had previously 
opted out of the web-based survey tool. 
 96. According to a recent meta-analysis, the average response rate for web surveys is 
34%. See Tse-Hua Shih & Xitao Fan, Comparing Response Rates from Web and Mail Surveys: 
A Meta-Analysis, 20 FIELD METHODS 249, 257 (2008). 
 97. We tested the survey questions with professionals whom the database did not include 
and refined the questions based on those responses. 
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C.  Key Study Data and Results 
The survey data provide a glimpse into management’s decision-
making process based on the experiences of some professionals working 
with distressed companies in restructuring matters.98 Although the data 
do not provide a complete picture—and the results are subject to the 
limitations typically applicable to this type of survey99—they offer 
meaningful insights into framing effects that may influence decision-
making in the context of distressed companies. In fact, the survey data 
acknowledge the prevalent use of loss framing by professionals in the 
industry and how that might impact management decisions that concern 
restructuring options.  
1.  General Types of Respondents and Their Experiences 
The majority of professionals are lawyers (85.9%), though financial 
consultants represent approximately 12.9% of the respondents.100 They 
work in firms of all sizes, as 44.7% work in firms that employ more 
than 100 lawyers, advisers, or bankers, as applicable, and 55.3% work 
in firms that employ 100 professionals or less. They also are a very 
experienced population, as 78.6% of the professionals have more than 
fifteen years of experience in the restructuring field. 
In the majority of their restructuring matters, these professionals 
primarily represented distressed companies (39.0%), secured creditors 
(21.3%), or different parties depending on the matter (26.6%).101 The 
majority of their matters involved assets of $100 million or less 
(64.8%). Approximately 12.2% of respondents indicated that the 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Although the response rate for the survey exceeds industry averages, see supra note 
96, it may be the case that respondents differ from nonrespondents on key statistics of interest 
(an empirical question to investigate in a future study).  
 99. Sample surveys are subject to a variety of errors that include coverage, sampling, 
nonresponse, and measurement. See generally ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERRORS AND 
SURVEY COSTS (1989) (discussing errors involved in sample surveys). To the extent that the list 
of professionals the American Bankruptcy Institute maintains does not represent the universe of 
such professionals, coverage error may be present. That is, the authors can only generalize the 
results to the population of professionals the sampling frame includes. Sampling error occurs in 
all sample surveys, by definition. For this survey, the sampling margin of error is +/- 2%. To the 
extent that nonrespondents to this survey differ from respondents on key variables of interest, 
nonresponse error may be present. Finally, to the extent that survey responses are inaccurate, 
measurement error may be present. See id. at 82–83, 133, 240, 295. 
 100. The data percentages this Article presents are based on valid responses; for example, 
50 respondents did not answer the question that concerned profession type, so these percentages 
are based on 403 respondents. The footnotes identify the number of respondents who answered 
a particular question if the question was missing a large segment of the population. Also, the 
Article uses the term “financial consultant” to represent financial advisers, investment bankers, 
and restructuring consultants. 
 101. A small segment of the population represented unsecured creditors (9.4%) or equity 
holders (1.0%), and 2.7% designated “other” as their response. 
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average size of their matters involved assets of more than $500 
million.102 This allocation is similar to the general demographics of 
companies that file Chapter 11 cases.103  
2.  What Professionals Say 
The majority of professionals (63.6 %) describe bankruptcy as “an 
option of last resort” or use a similar phrase when they discuss 
restructuring options with their distressed clients.104 Of those 
professionals who use the phrase, 39.3% use it most of the time and 
41.8% use it some of the time; only 11.8% use it in all circumstances 
(Table 1).105 The data show no significant effects based on profession 
type or whom the professional typically represents in distressed 
matters.106 Nevertheless, professionals with more than fifteen years of 
experience are significantly more likely to use the phrase than those 
with fewer years of experience (p<.001). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 102. Approximately 6% of these respondents indicated that the average size of their 
distressed matters involved debtors with assets of $1 billion or more.  
 103. For data that describes the general range of Chapter 11 cases, see Elizabeth Warren & 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 603, 607–10 (2009); Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and 
Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=866865 (discussing small and 
large bankruptcy case data). 
 104. The survey tool focused on both financial and economic distress, but it did not attempt 
to distinguish between the two. Specifically, it defined “distressed client(s)” as “business entity 
clients (both incorporated and unincorporated entities) that are experiencing or should anticipate 
experiencing financial distress, such as actual or potential loan defaults, liquidity issues, 
litigation risks, operational issues, balance sheet insolvency, or equitable insolvency.” 
 105. Responses were based on professionals’ experiences during the past five years. 
 106. Due to small subsample and cell sizes, statistical comparisons are possible among 
only professional types and client types on a collapsed variable (“all or most” versus 
“approximately half, some, or none”). Just over 50% of lawyers reported their use of such a 
phrase with “all or most” of their clients; similarly, 44% of financial advisers reported their use 
of such a phrase with “all or most” of their clients (p=.357). Small subsample and cell sizes 
permit statistical comparisons among client types such that the authors distinguished only 
among professionals to distressed companies or secured or unsecured creditors. The authors 
combined all other professionals into a fourth group. There is no significant difference in the 
percentage of professionals who used such a phrase with “all or most” of their clients by client 
type (p=.065). Interestingly, while only 37.3% of professionals to unsecured creditors reported 
such phrase usage, the majority of professionals to all other client types reported such usage 
(distressed companies: 53.2%; secured creditors: 65%; all others: 58.5%). The tests may prove 
insufficiently powered to detect a statistical difference among these groups.  
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Table 1. Proportion of Distressed Clients with Whom Phrase Used in 
Past 5 Years (n=280) 
 
 
Notably not all professionals use the phrase “bankruptcy as an option 
of last resort” to mean the same thing. Approximately half (52%) of the 
respondents use the phrase to mean that the “[d]istressed client should 
file a bankruptcy case only if it represents the alternative most likely to 
preserve or maximize value.”107 This use suggests that these 
professionals view bankruptcy as one of the many restructuring tools 
available to distressed clients that their clients should integrate into any 
meaningful restructuring discussions. Approximately 40% of the 
respondents, however, use the phrase to mean that the “[d]istressed 
client should file a bankruptcy case only after exhausting all of its out-
of-court restructuring alternatives.”108 This use carries a very different 
connotation. It arguably equates bankruptcy with complete failure. 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See infra Table 2. 
 108.  Id. 
25.0% 41.8% 4.6% 39.3% 11.8%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
None Some Approximately half Most All
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Table 2. Phrase Meaning (n=273) 
 
 
A professional’s decision to use the phrase “bankruptcy as an option 
of last resort”—regardless of the professional’s ultimate meaning—is 
understandable for the variety of reasons this Article discusses above.109 
For example, bankruptcy can be an expensive process. In fact, the 
majority (52.1%) of professionals who invoke the phrase cite cost as the 
most common reason they describe bankruptcy in this manner.110 In 
addition, professionals cite the uncertainty of the bankruptcy process 
(23.2%) and the potential loss of management control (12.0%) as the 
most common reasons that underlie their advice.111 Interestingly, only 
3.4% of respondents indicate loss of creditor control as a motivating 
factor.112 Although this perception may relate to the fact that many 
respondents represent debtors, the data also support literature that 
suggests a trend of less debtor, and more creditor, control in both 
Chapter 11 cases and in restructuring matters generally.113 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See supra Section I.A. 
 110.  See infra Table 3. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113. See supra Section I.A. In fact, several respondents commented that all response 
options other than “loss of creditor control” contributed to their use of the phrase “bankruptcy as 
an option of last resort.” 
5.1%
2.9%
39.9%
52.0%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
Other
File only if necessary to prevent
creditors from exercising default
remedies
File only after exhausting all of its out-
of-court restructuring alternatives
File only if it represents alternative most
likely to preserve or maximize value
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Table 3. Reason for Phrase Meaning (n=267) 
 
A distressed company should not undertake the filing of a 
Chapter 11 or any bankruptcy case lightly. The process can prove 
expensive, lengthy, and contentious.114 It also can, however, balance 
negotiating leverage and offer restructuring options, such as the 
facilitation of asset sales and the management of contract portfolios, not 
otherwise available to the parties.115 Moreover, the utility of these 
bankruptcy-specific tools may depend on the financial state of the 
company when it files for bankruptcy. Accordingly, how a distressed 
company receives and processes a professional’s advice to use 
“bankruptcy as an option of last resort” may significantly impact the 
outcome of any bankruptcy case. 
3.  What Clients Hear 
To understand how clients might respond to the phrase “bankruptcy 
as an option of last resort,” the survey asked several questions regarding 
the conduct of distressed clients in the restructuring representation. Of 
those professionals who used the phrase, a majority (51.6%) indicated 
that they have had a distressed client who refused to authorize the 
preparation of a bankruptcy filing at a time the professional thought 
appropriate.116 An overwhelming majority (90.0%) of those clients 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See supra Section I.A.  
 115. See supra Section I.A. 
 116. See infra Table 4. Clients appear more comfortable with professionals who discuss a 
9.4%
3.4%
12.0%
23.2%
52.1%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
Other
Loss of creditor control in bankruptcy
case, including in chapter 11 case
Loss of debtor control in bankruptcy
case, including in chapter 11 case
Uncertainty associated with
bankruptcy case
Cost and delay associated with
bankruptcy case
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ultimately filed a bankruptcy case.117 These professionals indicated that 
approximately 36% of the clients who rejected their advice to prepare 
bankruptcy materials did so because they believed the company’s 
distress was temporary or they denied the distress altogether.118 
 
Table 4. Initially Refused (n=426) / (If yes) Eventual Bankruptcy Case 
Filing (n=220) 
  
                                                                                                                     
potential bankruptcy filing in the context of negotiations with creditors. Only 31% of 
respondents reported having a distressed client who refused to authorize the professional to 
discuss a bankruptcy filing in the context of negotiations. Notably these data raise several 
related issues. For example, some commentators may argue that professionals want to prepare a 
case simply because of the fees generated by such activity. SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS: 
INSIDE CHAPTER 11—AN EXPOSE 2 (1989). Other commentators may question clients who 
authorize discussion of a bankruptcy filing in negotiations if the client does not intend to file 
such a case. Ivan J. Reich, Managing the Insolvency of a Borrower from Both the Debtor’s and 
Creditor’s Perspective During Tough Economic Times, ASPATORE (Apr. 2009), 2009 WL 
1615228, at *11 (discussing the reputational value in making honest, not empty, “threats” 
regarding filing for bankruptcy). Accordingly, future studies should consider these issues. 
 117.  See infra Table 4. 
 118. See infra Table 5; infra Appendix A, question 7. Specifically, these two responses 
were worded, “Belief that financial difficulties were temporary or short-term in nature,” and 
“General denial about financial or operational obstacles facing company.” The second most 
common reason respondents gave for clients’ reluctance to authorize the preparation of 
bankruptcy materials was potential negative impact on sales, with 23.8% of respondents 
identifying that secondary factor. The potential stigma associated with bankruptcy accounted for 
only 14.7% of the responses regarding the most common reason distressed clients resist 
bankruptcy preparations. 
No, 48.4%
Filed, 
90.0%
Not Filed, 9.5%
Missing, 0.5%
Yes, 51.6%
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Table 5. Reasons for Reluctance to Prepare Materials 
 
These data suggest a moderate association between loss framing 
(bankruptcy as a last resort) and clients taking a high-stakes gamble 
(e.g., betting that operations will turn around or a white knight will save 
the company from its despair).119 In addition, the most frequently stated 
reason for clients’ attempts to avoid bankruptcy (general denial of 
problems) suggests an optimism bias or belief that the company can 
overcome its existing financial or operational problems. These data 
collectively allude to some of the observations in prior studies that 
concern framing effects and prospect theory.120 Nevertheless, scholars 
should conduct more research on these issues in the distressed context.  
For example, the survey asked respondents generally about their 
experiences and observations from practice. Although the respondents 
bring a wealth of experience to the study, the data are generic in the 
sense that they do not document specific examples or offer evidence 
directly from the distressed company’s perspective. Given the structure 
of the Management Behavior Study, such direct observations are 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 67, at 1227 n.54 (“[M]anagers of financially 
distressed firms ‘have a strong incentive to gamble with the firm’s assets.’” (quoting Barry E. 
Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 
576 (1995))); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729, 733–34 
(noting that managers have similar incentives to gamble on the company’s future); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 471, 508 (1994) (noting that “shareholders of an insolvent company have little to lose if 
they gamble with the firm’s assets, [but have] much to gain”).  
 120. See supra Section I.B. 
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impracticable due to, among other things, concerns regarding 
confidentiality and the attorney–client privilege. Indeed, client-specific 
observations—from either the professional’s or the client’s 
perspective—may breach a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality or arguably 
waive some aspect of the attorney-client privilege on the topic.121 
Accordingly, researchers should continue to explore indirect or 
quantitative means to document the loss or gain frames they use in the 
restructuring dialogue and their potential impact.122 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Management Behavior Study 
offers insights into distressed companies’ decision-making processes 
that otherwise are not available. The prevalence of the use of loss 
framing alone is a meaningful contribution. The data permit inferences 
that can help policymakers question and reconsider how to legislate 
distress. They also can help restructuring professionals and business 
executives reevaluate how they approach potential restructuring options. 
Part III discusses these considerations. 
4.  Does the Dialogue Matter?  
The descriptive data above explain how professionals approach the 
restructuring dialogue with distressed clients and how they perceive 
clients’ resulting behavior. Further analysis of the data shows several 
significant effects and trends relevant to the study’s hypothesis.  
As explained above, studies suggest a correlation between loss 
frames and risk-seeking conduct. To identify any similar effects in the 
distressed company context, the survey asked respondents a variety of 
questions concerning their use of the phrase “bankruptcy as a last 
resort” and clients’ reactions to restructuring alternatives. Several 
interesting trends emerged. 
Both respondents who used the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” 
and those who did not reported experiences with distressed clients who 
refused to authorize the preparation of a bankruptcy case or introduce a 
bankruptcy alternative into restructuring negotiations at a time the 
professional thought appropriate. Likewise, both groups suggested that 
at least some of those clients ultimately filed a bankruptcy case. 
Nevertheless, respondents who never used the phrase “bankruptcy as a 
last resort” were significantly more likely to have a client who initially 
refused, but ultimately did, file a bankruptcy case. Specifically, 87.2% 
of those who used such a phrase and 96.2% of those who never used 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 (2000).  
 122. For example, researchers might design a simulation study in which participants 
answer hypothetical questions from the distressed company’s perspective based on realistic fact 
patterns developed through case studies. 
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such a phrase experienced a client who initially refused but ultimately 
filed (p=.032). 
The data suggest that professionals who do not introduce a loss 
frame into their strategy discussions with distressed clients generally 
have clients who are more willing to ultimately file a bankruptcy case. 
Other data support this inference. For example, respondents who used 
the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” with all or most of their clients 
in the past five years were less likely to have a client who initially 
refused, but ultimately filed, a bankruptcy case. Specifically, 82.9% of 
those who used such a phrase with all or most of their clients and 92.3% 
of those who used such a phrase with less than most of their clients 
experienced a client who initially refused, but ultimately filed, a case.123 
Based on the survey data, clients who hear the phrase “bankruptcy as a 
last resort” are more likely to pursue restructuring alternatives that 
avoid a bankruptcy filing. 
Accordingly, prospect theory and the perceived correlation between 
loss framing and risk-seeking conduct may explain the trend in the data. 
This suggests that the use of the phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” 
causes directors and managers to pursue riskier or less certain 
restructuring alternatives. For example, in an effort to fix the company’s 
financial or operational problems and avoid a bankruptcy filing, these 
directors and managers might agree to an out-of-court refinancing with 
exceptionally tight covenants and onerous fees and interest rates.  
Confirmation and overconfidence biases also might contribute to 
these decisions. Given the data and the role of heuristics in corporate 
restructurings, the following respondent narratives are illuminating. 
Respondents provided the following statements and explained why their 
clients generally refused to authorize the preparation of a bankruptcy 
case or the discussion of bankruptcy alternatives in restructuring 
negotiations: 
“[B]elief that other alternatives (additional financing or 
asset sale or sale of company) would come through before 
liquidity crises forced filing.” 
“Unfounded optimism that management could handle 
turnaround without benefits of bankruptcy.” 
“Client is in denial—something else will ‘rescue’ them 
from chapter 11.” 
“Trying to negotiate a better deal with creditors.” 
                                                                                                                     
 123. The difference does not reach statistical significance at traditional alpha levels likely 
due to insufficient power; however, the difference is in the hypothesized direction and trends 
toward significance (p=.095). 
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“Unrealistic belief that the lender was actually working 
WITH them.”124 
These statements support the hypothesis that cognitive biases and 
framing effects influence decisions in the distressed company context.  
Prospect theory and heuristics are, however, only one plausible 
explanation. The study’s findings do not prove a causal link between the 
phrase “bankruptcy as a last resort” and a client’s ultimate restructuring 
path. As this Article explains above, the design of the survey limits data 
analysis and our ability to isolate effects. For example, the respondents 
who reported that their clients, who initially refused to authorize the 
preparation of a bankruptcy case and also did not ultimately file a 
bankruptcy case, might have successfully resolved their clients’ distress 
in an out-of-court process. Likewise, discussions with, or pressures 
from, individuals other than the company’s professionals, such as 
creditors and equity investors, may have influenced the company’s 
decision. Moreover, the company simply may not have been able to 
secure debtor-in-possession financing to sustain a bankruptcy case, or 
the company may have held an asset or business that a filing would 
have adversely affected. The authors recognize these potential 
confounding factors and encourage further study of these issues. 
Nevertheless, the Management Behavior Study offers a first glimpse 
into distressed companies’ counseling and decision-making processes 
and should inform future policy decisions.  
III.  CHANGING THE FRAME TO FACILITATE BETTER RESULTS 
An effective bankruptcy system is vital to a well-functioning 
economy.125 It can encourage entrepreneurial activity and spur economic 
development.126 The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code wisely balanced the 
goals of rehabilitation with value maximization to rehabilitate distressed 
companies where that end generated the greatest value for all. Notably, 
many commentators observe that the Bankruptcy Code no longer governs 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Responses to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors). 
 125. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 335, 354 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in 
an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 343–44 (1993). 
 126. See Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 856–58 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy can provide entrepreneurs 
with a fresh start and that entrepreneurs are more likely to live in states with higher bankruptcy 
exemption levels); see also Warren, supra note 125, at 342, 342 n.14 (noting the higher rate of 
bankruptcy filings among entrepreneurs and small business owners); cf. Douglas G. Baird & 
Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2310, 2312, 2316 (2005) (acknowledging some value in Chapter 11 for entrepreneurs but 
arguing that the current process is inefficient, particularly for serial entrepreneurs). 
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as intended.127 The Bankruptcy Code certainly cannot facilitate successful 
reorganizations if distressed companies try to avoid its application at all 
reasonable costs. 
This Part considers these observations in light of the Management 
Behavior Study and proposes potential changes to the restructuring 
landscape to facilitate more successful failures. It first reviews the 
existing restructuring landscape and the potential challenges for 
distressed companies that operate in the current environment. This 
examination leads to several potential policy and legislative changes to 
mitigate the real (or perceived) concerns of distressed companies that 
consider a bankruptcy filing. These proposals focus on one aspect of the 
U.S. bankruptcy system—hybrid restructurings—and suggest a 
streamlined process and an incentive structure that work not only for 
distressed companies but also for their stakeholders. 
A. The Need for Change 
The Bankruptcy Code is the fifth set of federal bankruptcy laws enacted 
in the United States.128 Its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the 
Bankruptcy Act), is the only other long-standing piece of legislation, given 
the short-lived nature of all prior federal bankruptcy statutes.129 
Practitioners and policymakers considered reform of the Bankruptcy Act in 
1968 because, among other things, public companies resisted Chapter X of 
the Bankruptcy Act, which was the chapter specifically designated for 
those cases.130 Many of these companies either did not file to obtain the 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 
443 (1992) (“[B]ankruptcy’s reallocative provisions, including bankruptcy reorganization, its 
most pernicious reallocation vehicle, lack justification and [] Congress should abolish them.”); 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751 
(2002) (“Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines 
when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent 
failure.”); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 
YALE L.J. 1043, 1088–89 (1992) (“Chapter 11 should be repealed and replaced” because there is 
no economic benefit from the current model of court-supervised corporate reorganizations); 
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 611 (1993) (concluding that Chapter 11 has 
mixed success and “is not a complete failure”). 
 128. Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 
941, 941 (1979). 
 129. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 13–14, 23, 29–30 (1995) (discussing the frequent and significant 
changes to bankruptcy laws prior to the Chandler Act, and noting the forty-year period the 
Chandler Act was in effect).  
 130. Chapter X broke with the past in that Chapter X replaced with an independent trustee 
a company’s existing managers, who had previously continued to run the business, and the 
company’s existing bankers, who had previously run the reorganization. The independent 
trustee, alone, retained the power to develop the terms of the reorganization. By its terms, it 
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relief they needed or they tried to qualify for relief under Chapter XI of the 
Bankruptcy Act, which was designed for small business cases.131 These 
developments undercut the value of the Bankruptcy Act and did not serve 
the interests of public companies or their stakeholders.132 
The resulting reforms produced the existing Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. As this Article discusses above, however, a shift 
away from Chapter 11—similar to that which occurred in 1950s in the 
context of Chapter X133—is afoot. The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code 
indicate that it likely has outlived its shelf life and that it is time once 
again for reform.134 Although many commentators cite several different 
factors to support reform,135 this Article focuses on a factor not yet 
                                                                                                                     
required public companies and companies with liabilities in excess of $250,000 to file in 
Chapter X; however, companies found a loophole and sought to avoid Chapter X at all costs. 
SKEEL, supra note 45, at 119–20, 162. Moreover, Chapter X could implicate significant 
government involvement; Chapter X aimed to “afford greater protection to creditors and 
stockholders by providing . . . impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate 
reorganizations through . . . active participation of the SEC.’” SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 
379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965); see also Allen F. Corotto & Irving H. Picard, Business 
Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978—A New Approach to Investor 
Protections and the Role of the SEC, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 962 (1979) (discussing SEC 
involvement in corporate reorganization under Chapter X); Paul R. Glassman, Solicitation of 
Plan Rejections Under the Bankruptcy Code, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 262–64 (1988) 
(discussing the features and workflow of Chapter X); Klee, supra note 128, at 942 (noting that 
Senator Quentin Burdick chaired hearings conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 
to determine whether to form a commission to review the bankruptcy laws). 
 131. The drafters designed Chapter XI, in contrast to Chapter X of the Chandler Act, for 
small corporate debtors and mom-and-pop firms. Chapter XI allowed the company management 
to continue to run the business during the reorganization and also allowed the company to 
choose counsel and professional staff to administer the reorganization process. SKEEL, supra 
note 45, at 162–63.  
 132. Id. at 172 (noting that many large firms that would benefit from a thoughtful 
reorganization process did not “view[] bankruptcy as part of the ordinary arsenal of weapons for 
solving corporate problems” during the Chandler Act era, and, as such, filed for bankruptcy 
“only as an absolute last resort”). 
 133. See id. at 162. 
 134. See Kenneth N. Klee & Richard Levin, Rethinking Chapter 11, 21 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 5 art. 1 (Nov. 2012) (“[T]he chapter 11 system is itself in distress, having been asked to 
do far more than it was designed to do . . . . [S]everal efforts are underway among the practicing 
bar to rethink[ ]chapter 11, with a view toward making it work with today’s (and tomorrow’s) 
economic and financial system.”). The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) is one example of reforms to the current Bankruptcy Code. See 
generally Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The 
Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603 (2005) (discussing BAPCPA in detail). 
 135. Klee & Levin, supra note 134, art. 1 (considering reform of four areas of 
reorganization: corporate governance, DIP financing, the “sale of all or substantially all of the 
business’s assets, and reorganization plan voting and distribution issues”). 
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discussed in the literature—the underutilization of the Bankruptcy 
Code.136 
After a spike in early 2009, the number of Chapter 11 filings has 
been steadily decreasing.137 Commentators acknowledge that fewer 
companies choose Chapter 11 as a viable restructuring option, and those 
companies that file are mainly selling or liquidating.138 In this respect, 
bankruptcy really is an option of last resort—a place where companies 
go to die. Any changes to this emerging reality will take more than a 
few legislative tweaks, and a complete overhaul of the bankruptcy 
system is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this Article 
focuses on one critical component of the current and any future 
bankruptcy legislation: the creation of a nonthreatening environment 
and streamlined process that distressed companies (and their creditors) 
willingly embrace. 
B.  Encouraging More Hybrid Restructurings 
A thoughtful study by the World Bank defines hybrid restructurings 
as “workout procedures in which there is a mixture of the features of 
contractual workouts and limited court intervention.”139 The World 
Bank discusses hybrid procedures as one alternative in its “continuum 
of procedures for the treatment of financial difficulties.”140 Likewise, 
this Article contemplates the use of hybrid restructurings as part of a 
robust system for distress resolution. 
In the United States, the prepackaged and, to some extent, the 
prearranged Chapter 11 cases represent hybrid restructurings. As 
Subsection I.A.3 discusses, however, both alternatives are limited in 
application and utility. Neither alternative is available to all distressed 
companies; rather, companies generally need a small group of creditors, 
                                                                                                                     
 136. See supra Subsection I.A.2. 
 137. Jacob Barron, Commercial Bankruptcies Down 22% in 2012, NAT’L ASS’N CREDIT 
MGMT. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2013), http://blog.nacm.org/blog/jake-blog/commercial-bankruptcies-
down-22-in-2012; Jonathan Carson & Michael Frishberg, Mapping Administrative Strategies to 
Changing Paradigms of Chapter 11, ASPATORE (Sept. 2010), 2010 WL 3650164, at *2; 
Bankruptcy Filings Down in Fiscal Year 2012, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://news.uscourts.gov/bankruptcy-filings-down-fiscal-year-2012.  
 138. Robert D. Wilcox, The Current Bankruptcy Environment: What Lawyers Need to 
Know, ASPATORE, (Nov. 2010), 2010 WL 4735524, at *1, *2, *7 (noting that companies 
perceive the Chapter 11 alternatives as a better choice for reorganization and that companies 
increasingly use bankruptcy as a way to sell assets free and clear of liabilities rather than for 
reorganization). In addition, some practitioners see a pronounced spike in creditor use of 
receivership proceedings, which may or may not also include a Chapter 11 proceeding. Jeffrey 
R. Barber, Shifting Economic Landscape, Shifting Legal Strategies: The Increased Use of 
Receivership Proceedings and Selected Bankruptcy Trends, ASPATORE (Feb. 2011), 2011 WL 
586145, at *1.  
 139. GARRIDO, supra note 56, at 47. 
 140. Id. at 3. 
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limited financial or operational problems, or a certain capital structure 
to invoke either a prepackaged or prearranged process successfully.141 
Moreover, a distressed company that tries but fails to implement one of 
these hybrid restructurings receives little, if any, credit for those efforts 
in any subsequent bankruptcy case.  
Despite these challenges, hybrid restructurings are an important key 
to unlocking the potential value of the bankruptcy process for many 
companies. If companies implement hybrid restructurings appropriately, 
then they can encourage earlier acknowledgement of distress, more 
meaningful restructuring negotiations with a broader group of 
constituencies, and more efficient resolutions. Any such structure, 
however, must integrate incentives and tools to mitigate some of the 
heuristics the Management Behavior Survey identifies. The “meet and 
confer” process this Article discusses below combines certain 
advantages of a formal bankruptcy filing with the flexibility and speed 
of an out-of-court restructuring as well as the enhanced options for 
companies that proactively manage their distress. 
1.  Overview of Meet and Confer 
The meet and confer process (the MCP) would facilitate broad 
restructuring negotiations in the shadows of a formal bankruptcy case, 
but with more certainty and greater restructuring options than the 
current prepackaged or prearranged plan process. A company could file 
a notice in the appropriate district or bankruptcy court (the MC Notice) 
and initiate an MCP.142 This notice would identify the company and any 
affiliates involved in the MCP; the company’s secured creditors; the 
company’s stakeholder committee (discussed below); and the name of a 
proposed facilitator to assist the parties in their discussions and the 
development of a proposed plan.143 The MC Notice would trigger a 
short standstill period, which would enjoin creditors from the exercise 
of their collection rights against the company, and the company could 
pay only ordinary course business expenses.144 The MCP could end in 
one of several ways: the company’s commencement of a formal case 
primarily to solicit acceptance and confirmation of the negotiated plan; 
the company’s commencement of a formal, more traditional case with 
enhanced options (e.g., a longer exclusive period to file a plan and 
additional time to determine treatment of contracts and leases); or the 
company’s dismissal of the MC notice (e.g., the key parties either reach 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
 142. The mechanics of the filing process could be similar to those that § 301 of the 
Bankruptcy Code uses for the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). The 
primary difference would be in the effect of the filing and the resulting process. 
 143. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
 144. See infra Subsection III.B.3. 
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a consensual out-of-court plan that does not require court 
implementation or they agree that the state law should govern the 
company’s reorganization).145 
The MCP would strive to create a stable and productive environment 
for the distressed company and its creditors. The standstill and 
contemplated multiparty negotiation format would allow the parties to 
focus on the causes and potential resolution of the company’s distress 
without the distractions and often counterproductive noise that 
surrounds the first days of a formal bankruptcy case.146 Although still a 
quasi-judicial process, directors and managers may feel less threatened 
by the MCP because the process would not force them to operate inside 
of a fishbowl during what is often the most sensitive period of 
restructuring negotiations. They also would retain authority to dismiss 
the MCP at any point, but would receive “credit” for their efforts if they 
ultimately decide a formal, more traditional case is necessary.147 In 
many ways, the MCP offers great potential upside with little downside 
risk. It is a restructuring alternative that seeks to shift the bankruptcy 
discussion to a gain frame and promote more timely utilization by 
distressed companies.148 
2.  The MC Notice and the Parties 
A traditional bankruptcy filing requires a large amount of preparation, 
paperwork, and effort.149 Those elements can distract management and 
professionals from core issues that surround the company’s distress and 
cause management to doubt the value of the bankruptcy process. As one 
respondent to the Management Behavior Study observed, clients resisted 
preparation of a bankruptcy filing because of “[c]ost and the fact that the 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See infra Subsection III.B.4. 
 146. See David Anthony, Big New Case in Nashville Bankruptcy Court, CREDITORS 
RIGHTS 101 BLOG (June 12, 2012), http://creditorsrights101.com/tag/first-day-motions 
(discussing the excitement for first-day motions in larger Chapter 11 cases); AMERICAN 
BANKR. INST., ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 FIELD HEARING: 
MINUTES/SUMMARY (Nov. 30,  2012),  http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/
files/ABI%20Commission%20Minutes%20Nov_30_2012.docx/ (discussing the complexity of 
first day motions hearings). 
 147. See infra Subsection III.B.4. 
 148. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing CEO risk-taking to avoid a perceived failure in 
filing for bankruptcy); cf. Kahneman, supra note 83, at 1456 (noting that when decision-makers 
face certain loss, they engage in more risk-seeking behavior). 
 149. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002 (providing that voluntary case is commenced by filing 
petition with the court); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007 (noting the various lists, schedules, statements, 
and other documents that must accompany the petition). For a discussion of first-day motions 
practice, see generally Jay M. Goffman & Grenville R. Day, First Day Motions and Orders in 
Large Chapter 11 Cases: (Critical Vendor, DIP Financing and Cash Management Issues), 12 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 59, 63–73 (2003). 
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results that might be achieved did not justify the risk.”150 The MCP 
lowers entry barriers to the types of restructuring negotiations that 
formal cases often facilitate. 
The MC Notice would invoke the jurisdiction of the court primarily 
to enforce the standstill period this Article discusses below151 and to 
streamline the commencement of a formal case when such is the exit 
strategy of choice that follows the MCP. Only a company, as debtor, 
could file an MC Notice, and the court could require affidavits from the 
company’s top executives and professionals that certify that the 
company filed the notice in good faith and in accordance with the 
statutory requirements.152 The applicable statute could include 
appropriate safeguards and allow a company to file an MC Notice only 
if it is not in default or subject to a notice of default under any of its 
secured credit obligations or some set percentage of its unsecured debt; 
if it does not file the MC Notice in response to a specific enforcement 
action or litigation matter; and if it did not file a bankruptcy case or MC 
Notice in the past 180 days (or some other appropriate period). These 
requirements ultimately should be designed to deter parties who use the 
MCP as a delay tactic and to encourage parties to initiate the 
restructuring negotiations earlier in the company’s distress. 
The MC Notice would identify the key parties to the restructuring 
negotiations. In addition to the company’s secured creditors, the 
company should identify representatives of its major unsecured creditor 
groups and interest holders to form its stakeholder committee.153 The 
company should ground the stakeholder committee in type of interest, 
rather than size of those interests, to ensure a dynamic discussion of the 
company’s restructuring options.154 The company would pay the fees 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors). 
 151. See infra Subsection III.B.3. 
 152. Creditors who wish to file an involuntary petition against a debtor must meet the 
initial conditions. If the court dismisses their case, the court may require the creditors to pay 
costs, or, if the court determines that the creditors filed the involuntary petition in bad faith, the 
court may subject the creditors to significant damages. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), 303(i) (2006). 
 153. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 754 
(2011) (“A creditors’ committee is designed to protect and promote the interests of general 
unsecured creditors.”); id. at 781, 784, 788–89 (discussing performance of creditors’ committees 
in promoting unsecured creditors’ interests); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind 
Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1155, 1161 (2011) (“[T]he creditors’ committee often is central to ensuring a fair and successful 
reorganization process.”); Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 717 (2010) 
(suggesting a role for a shareholder representative “to do the shareholder job of monitoring 
management”). 
 154. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Potential Value of Dynamic Tension in 
Restructuring Negotiations, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011 (discussing how competing 
agendas, along with active engagement in a bankruptcy case—i.e., the dynamic tension—may 
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for counsel the stakeholder committee selects and retains, provided that 
the company could request that the court order a member of the 
committee or any secured creditor to pay its own counsel and other 
advisor fees upon a showing of bad faith or obstructionist conduct by 
that party.  
The MC Notice also would identify a third-party neutral to serve as 
facilitator in the restructuring negotiations.155 The facilitator should be 
completely disinterested in the matter.156 The facilitator’s primary 
objective should be to foster meaningful and informed dialogue among 
the parties and assist the company in its evaluation of its restructuring 
alternatives. The facilitator also might serve a valuable and ongoing role 
in any subsequent formal bankruptcy case.157 
3.  The Standstill 
The standstill period is necessary to create a stable and safe 
environment for the restructuring negotiations. Under existing U.S. laws 
that govern hybrid procedures, companies can obtain a standstill only 
through a contractual agreement with their creditors in an out-of-court 
proceeding.158 Because the MC Notice triggers the quasi-judicial nature 
of the MCP, it permits a broader standstill agreement that levels the 
playing field and allows more parties a seat at the negotiating table, but 
                                                                                                                     
result in better outcomes for those cases).  
 155. Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 475 (2011) (discussing a role for a third-party 
neutral who could serve as an objective party, and facilitate the flow of information, with the 
ultimate goals of reducing conflict, correcting information asymmetries, and enhancing estate 
value for all stakeholders); id. at 516–17 (noting how the use of third-party neutrals,or “case 
facilitator,” experienced limited success in the United Kingdom in its encouragement of out-of-
court workouts as well).  
 156. Id. at 508 (“[L]ack of independence may create biases and increase rather than resolve 
conflicts in the restructuring.”). A “disinterested person” is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) 
(2006) as:  
a person that—(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; 
(B) is not and was not, within 2 years before the date of the filing of the 
petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor; and (C) does not have an 
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of 
creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indirect 
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other 
reason. 
Id. 
 157. Harner, supra note 155, at 473, 475 (noting that intercreditor conflict in bankruptcy 
can erode the value of the estate and discussing a role for a third-party neutral who could 
ameliorate much of the conflict and assist the bankruptcy court).  
 158. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 
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it does not tip the scales dramatically in favor of any one party.159 
Nevertheless, policymakers should craft carefully the legislation 
implementing the standstill period and tailor it to serve the objectives of 
the process while preserving all parties’ rights if the process fails. 
For example, if the company qualifies for an MCP, the initial 
standstill could last sixty days, with a possible thirty-day extension.160 
During the standstill period, creditors would be enjoined from pursuit of 
their collection rights against the company.161 The company in turn 
would be permitted to pay only ordinary course business expenses and 
would be required to stay current on those expenses, as well as any 
interest or other current obligations under its funded debt (absent an 
agreement to the contrary with the affected creditors). Notably, these 
standards would require a company to invoke an MCP prior to any 
liquidity crises or major defaults on funded debt. 
4.  The MCO Exit Plan 
The MCP would have no required or preconceived exit strategy. 
Although most companies could invoke the process to work towards a 
restructuring plan that resolves its distress, that plan might not 
                                                                                                                     
 159. In France:  
[s]afeguard proceedings are aimed at improving the chances of survival of a 
company facing difficulties by anticipating the situation at an early stage and 
seeking to negotiate a safeguard plan with its creditors to ensure the 
continuation of the company’s business, to maintain employment and to 
restructure the company’s indebtedness . . . . Safeguard proceedings can only 
be initiated by a debtor company if it is solvent and demonstrates that it is 
encountering difficulties that it is not able to overcome.  
Rod Cork & Marc Santoni, France: Restructuring and Insolvency Procedures, INT’L FIN. L. 
REV. (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2166556/France-Restructuring-and-
insolvency-procedures.html. 
 160. The process also could contemplate longer extensions with the consensus of a 
majority or supermajority of the parties identified in the MC Notice. Notably, a voluntary 
standstill agreement between a debtor and its creditors is a central feature of many out-of-court 
restructuring approaches, which include the London Approach and the related INSOL Principles 
that the INSOL Lenders Group developed. See Esteban C. Buljevich, The Workout Decalogue: 
The New Global Approach to Debt Restructurings, in CROSS-BORDER DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: 
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR CREDITORS, CORPORATES AND SOVEREIGNS 1, 8, 15 (2005), 
available at http://www.euromoneyooks.com/images/covers/Cross-Border%20Debt%20
Restructurings%20Innovative%20Approaches%20for%20Creditors%20Corporates%20and%
20Sovereigns/Debt%20ch1.pdf. In addition, some countries seek to facilitate similar out-of-
court workouts through legislation. See id. at 11–12. 
 161. The MCP statute would need to preserve the status quo among the company and its 
creditors during the standstill period. Accordingly, the statute would need to toll any applicable 
deadlines that relate to creditors’ enforcement rights. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2006) (tolling certain 
claims against debtors, so long as the original period to file the claim against the debtor has not 
expired before the debtor files its bankruptcy petition). 
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materialize through the process or it might take any number of forms or 
may not materialize through the process. If a plan emerges that 
incorporates aspects of the Bankruptcy Code, such as a sale of assets, a 
debt-for-equity exchange that eliminates existing equity holders, or the 
rejection of contracts or leases, the company could commence a 
streamlined formal bankruptcy case upon the conclusion of the MCP to 
solicit acceptances and confirmation of the plan.162 If a plan can be 
accomplished consensually and without the need for court approval, the 
company could simply dismiss the MC Notice and proceed to 
implement the plan outside of any formal case.163 
Likewise, if a company completes the MCP and no plan emerges, 
the company could dismiss the MC Notice and try to continue 
operations and restructuring discussions without any formal bankruptcy 
case. Alternatively, if the company wanted to commence a formal, 
traditional case under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it 
could do so. The statute could recognize or reward the company’s 
proactive efforts in the MCP if it provides special treatment for MCP 
debtors. For example, the MCP debtor could receive a longer exclusive 
period to file and solicit acceptances of its plan; it could receive 
additional time to elect to assume or reject contracts and leases 
(including commercial leases); and it could receive the benefit of 
streamlined disclosures (particularly if the facilitator remains in the case 
and files status reports with the court).164 
The exit elements of the MCP would prove important to counter 
several of the heuristics this Article discusses above.165 The 
contemplated structure would allow directors and managers to test the 
bankruptcy process in several respects without incurring significant 
costs, facing intense public scrutiny, or losing control of the company’s 
alternatives if the MCP fails.166 The short duration of the initial 
standstill period and the involvement of multiple parties, which include 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See, e.g., id. § 363(b)(1) (permitting the trustee to sell, use, or lease property of the 
estate, when not in the ordinary course of business, but only after notice and a hearing); id. 
§ 365(a) (permitting the trustee to assume or reject an executory contract or expired lease of the 
debtor subject to the courts’ approval); id. § 1126 (discussing plan acceptance for parties whose 
claim the plan impairs).  
 163. See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
 164. Several sections of the Code may need modification to accommodate special MCP 
treatment. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (limiting the period during which the debtor can 
reject an unexpired commercial lease to 120 days, with the ability to extend the period for a 
maximum of 90 days for cause); id. § 1121 (specifying time periods for the debtor, exclusively, 
to file and solicit votes on a plan and also limiting the opportunity to extend that period). 
 165. See supra Section I.B. 
 166. See supra Section I.B. 
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a disinterested facilitator, would mitigate abusive or wrongful conduct 
by the company’s directors and managers.167 
5.  The Potential Benefits 
Several respondents in the Management Behavior Study discuss the 
“extreme” nature of a bankruptcy filing and the potential unknown or 
unintended consequences. As one respondent explains, clients resist 
bankruptcy alternatives because it is the “most extreme option; it leaves 
interim solutions out.”168 The MCP creates a quasi-bankruptcy or hybrid 
restructuring alternative that addresses these and other issues and fosters 
discussion of bankruptcy options as something other than a last 
resort.169 
The requirements to invoke the MCP and the standstill period 
encourage companies and professionals to discuss the option before the 
company’s distress becomes too severe.170 A company in default or a 
defensive posture with its creditors likely will not qualify for the 
process. The MCP recognizes the value in addressing distress when 
there is still a viable company to restructure and rewards management 
who adopt this proactive strategy. 
Moreover, although a quasi-bankruptcy process, the MCP statute 
would neither designate as a “debtor” the company that invoked an 
MCP nor subject it to a bankruptcy case. This distinction might be 
meaningless to some, but incredibly important to others. Specifically, 
the non-bankruptcy nature of the MCP itself, the minimal (if any) 
disruption of operations, and the elimination of the noise typically 
associated with the first days of a bankruptcy case could be significant 
differences for many. In this context, an MCP may reduce significantly 
the representative issues and related heuristics that might impede an 
executive’s decisions with respect to a traditional bankruptcy case.171 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See infra Subsection III.B.6. 
 168. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors). 
 169. “According to the World Bank Principles, an effective [restructuring] system should 
include, ‘Laws and procedures that flexibly accommodate a broad range of restructuring 
activities’ . . . . [and] should be flexible enough to allow the use by creditors and debtors of a 
wide array of restructuring techniques.” GARRIDO, supra note 56, at 20. Moreover, the MCP 
would result in less reputational damages and carry less stigma than a formal process. See id. at 
10. 
 170. See supra Subsections III.B.2–3. 
 171. See supra Section I.B. 
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6.  The Potential Challenges 
The MCP tries to strike an appropriate balance among the competing 
interests of a distressed company and all of its constituencies; the 
different types and causes of distress; and the authority and 
accountability of the distressed company’s management. The balance is 
delicate and likely subject to criticism. For example, some creditors 
may believe that the standstill is too long or onerous.172 Others may 
argue against the company’s role as the only party that can initiate the 
MCP or an exit strategy.173 Still others may seek to eliminate the 
proposed advantages to an MCP debtor in a subsequent Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 case.174 
This Article addresses each of these and other potential issues in the 
outline of the proposal above, and they are fair points worthy of 
consideration.175 As with any proposal, the devil would be in the details 
of the MCP statute, and the drafters would need to carefully evaluate 
these issues when they draft the qualification standards and the 
standstill parameters. In addition, the statute would need to include 
provisions that address abuses of the process by either the distressed 
company or stakeholders and the consequences of such conduct. The 
MCP discussion in this Article is a framework to guide deliberations of 
the competing considerations and help develop an appropriate hybrid 
restructuring process. The end goal should be to devise a structure that 
highlights the potential utility of a bankruptcy or quasi-bankruptcy 
process and engenders a positive or gain frame perception among 
professionals and business executives.176 
CONCLUSION 
The data this Article presents confirm what many commentators and 
practitioners long expected—management typically resists 
consideration of a bankruptcy case until it is arguably too late to use that 
restructuring tool effectively. This finding is particularly relevant in the 
current environment where an increasing number of distressed 
companies appear to file bankruptcy cases only to sell their assets or 
liquidate. These companies generally do not use bankruptcy to 
reorganize their businesses. The attendant loss of jobs and revenue is 
striking. 
This Article and the Management Behavior Study offer the first 
empirical glimpse into a potential contributing factor to this trend—
                                                                                                                     
 172. See supra Subsection III.B.3. 
 173. See supra Subsections III.B.2, III.B.4. 
 174. See supra Subsection III.B.4. 
 175. See supra Subsections III.B.2–4. 
 176. See supra Subsections I.B.2, III.B.1; see also Kahneman, supra note 83, at 1456. 
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management heuristics, cognitive biases, and loss framing. The study 
shows a prevalent description of bankruptcy as an “option of last 
resort.” This approach may enable risk-seeking conduct by 
management, a behavioral tendency to which management may be 
predisposed given studies that suggest management’s susceptibility to 
confirmation and over-confidence biases. As one respondent to the 
Management Behavior Study explains, management possesses 
“[u]nfounded optimism that [it] could handle turnaround without 
benefits of” the Bankruptcy Code.177 
The meet and confer process this Article describes is designed to 
counter several of these heuristics and encourage more thoughtful 
discussions of the role of bankruptcy or quasi-bankruptcy tools in 
restructuring negotiations.178 The MCP allows management control over 
the timing and exit strategy that the process develops, but promotes 
more timely consideration of the company’s distress through the 
qualification standards and standstill parameters that the process 
integrates. It further strikes a delicate balance between the requisite 
incentives that foster management engagement and the requisite 
protections that preserve creditors’ rights throughout the process. At its 
core, the MCP strives to help management recognize distress for what it 
might be—an opportunity to facilitate a successful failure.179 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Response to Management Behavior Study (on file with authors). 
 178. See supra Sections I.B., III.B. 
 179. See, e.g., Sergio Marchionne, CEO, Chrysler Group LLC, A Year of Transformation, 
Address at the NADA/IHS Global Insight Automotive Forum (Mar. 30, 2010) (video recording 
available at http://blog.chryslerllc.com/blog.do?p=day&ds=30032010) (“The presentation of our 
plan in November last year was entitled ‘From Chapter 11 to Chapter 1,’ as it represents a new 
beginning for Chrysler. It is our road map for creative reconstruction.”). 
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